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INTRODIUCTORY
It is a long standing practice among insurance companies to include
in policies covering property loss and damage a provision to the effect
that if, in event of loss or damage, the parties fail to agree upon the amount
thereof, the matter shall be submitted to third persons to ascertain and
*Ph.B., LL.B., J.D., LL.D; Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Yale Law
School; Visiting Professor of Law, University of \liaini Law School; former Chairmani of
the Board of Directors, American Arbitration Association.
**Practicing attorney associated with Lassiter, Moore and \Tan Allen, Charlotte,
North Carolina.
This study of appraisals under insurance policies is an elaboration and extension
of treatment of the subject as prepared for Professor Sturges' forthconing treatise on
Arbitration.
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award the amount. This provision is intended to provide a mode of settle-
ment rather than to litigate the matter. The provision contemplates a deter-
muination of the amount of money to be paid by the insurer-not merely an
inventory of the property lost and damaged. Its use in fire insurance policies
probably is best known.
The use of these provisions began before statutory standard fire insur-
ance policies were inaugurated; standard policy forms carry such a provision
in most American jurisdictions.
Prior to the statutory form of policy the terms of these provisions and
their integration in the policies of the different companies varied consider-
ably. Standard policy legislation brought about more uniformity.
The legal career of these provisions-their validity, revocability and
enforceability-and appraisals and awards under them is truly an interesting
one. Many judicial decisions and various statutes have contributed to its
make-up. Although the use of the provision is made mandatory in a majority
of the American jurisdictions by standard policy legislation, this mode of
settlement of differences arising between the insured and insurer over the
amount of loss and damage is rarely used. When the parties fail to agree,
they litigate. To invoke the provision accomplishes little beyond adding
technicalities of pleadings and proof and collateral issues to the litigation.
This is the result of judicial decisions relating to the provision. There has
been almost no legislative endeavor to make the appraisal process more useful.
Accordingly, this study must seek its reward in projecting promise for
the usefulness of this mode of settlement of the differences referred to if
and when it shall be adequately implemented by competent legislation. With
such aid, its promise seems as apparent as modern statutory arbitration. It
also is concluded that for any legislative reform to be fully effective in this
field, it must reckon with the various legal traditions to which the provision
and appraisals thereunder are now heir and how best to disown or redirect
many of them.
The appraisal as a mode of settlement of the differences referred to
has been likened to common law arbitration in various particulars and
differentiated in others. A substantial part of the judicial decisions have
involved these comparisons; in others, however, no such comparisons appear.
In the latter cases, it is generally assumed that the appraisal or the agree-
merit therefor is an arbitration or arbitration agreement, as the ease may be.
The break-down in the use and usefulness of this mode of settlement
of the differences referred to is attributable in considerable part to judicial
decisions dealing with revocability of the appraisal provision. Collateral
doctrines, such as "waiver," have been reared in these cases. These doctrines
have been woven into a labyrinth of technicalities in which the provision
can rarely survive and function. Judicial decisions also have cast shadows
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over the parties' right of hearing in the appraisal proceedings. Some recog-
nize the right, but others have limited or denied it.
Modern arbitration statutes have scarcely noticed this mode of settle-
inent. Even when such recognition has been indicated, some judicial deci-
sions have been reluctant to allow it. Availability of rights and remedies
of the arbitration statutes is doubtful, InI a few jurisdictions statutes strike
down these appraisal provisions and invalidate proceedings under them.
These are the matters with which this study is concerned.
PROVISIONS FOR APPRAISAL OF LOSS AND DAMAGE-REVOCABILITY
1. General
It has been a much litigated question in British and American courts
whether or not appraisal provisions should be held revocable in conformity
with common law revocability of arbitration provisions generally.
More particularly stated, the question posed and answered has been
whether or not, there being a loss, the insured can disregard the provision
and sue to collect on the policy; whether or not the insurer can plead the'
provision to defeat any action brought by the insured before an appraisal
to collect on the policy.
The answer to this general question, as determined by the British and
most of the American courts, may be stated broadly as follows: If a provi-
sion to refer differences over the amount of loss or damage is properly
drafted and adequately integrated with the insurer's undertaking in the
policy to pay, it is irrevocable contrary to common law revocability of pro-
visions to arbitrate disputes generally which may arise between the parties
in the future. Otherwise, it is revocable.
I-low, in what terms, must the provision be drafted and integrated in
the policy to attain irrevocability? Vhen answered in the broad generaliza-
tions of judicial summaries in the cases, the provision must be drafted as
a "condition precedent" to the insured's "right of action" to collect on the
policy. If it is so drafted it is not revocable.' If it is not so drafted it is a
"collateral" and "independent" undertaking, and is revocable because it is
1. U.S. Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242
(1890); Gauche v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 10 Fed. 347 (5th Cir. 1881).
ALA. Western Assurance Co. v. Hall, 112 Ala. 318, 20 So. '147 (1895); Ex parte
Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 233 Ala. 370, 172 So. 99 (1937) (also holding that the
provision is a good defense at law, so there is no good cause to support a petition to
transfer the action to the equity docket-the insurer's remedy at law is full and
adequate).
CAL. Adams v. South British & Nat. F. & M. Ins. Co., 70 Cal. 198, 11 Pac.
627 (1886); Old Saucelito Land & Dry-Dock Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co.,
66 Col. 253, 5 Pac. 232 (1884).
FLA. Southem Home Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 57 Fla. 194, 49 So. 542 (1909);
see New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Blackshear. 116 Fla. 289, 156 So. 695 (1934).
GA. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Lan, 34 Ga. App. 246, 129 S.F. 116 (1925);
Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tumley, 100 Ga. 296, 27 S.E. 975 (1897).
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against public policy in that it would "oust the courts of their jurisdiction. '"2
Before examining the cases for the detail of this draftsmanship and
integration, reference will be made to certain aspects of the judicial process
in accomplishing the irrevocability of these provisions. They are significant
IOWA. George Dec & Sons Co. v. Key City Fire Ins. Co., 104 Iowa 167, 73
N.W. 594 (1897); Zalesky v. Home Ins. Co., 102 Iowa 613, 71 NAW. 566 (1897).
LA. Hart v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 136 La. 114, 66 So. 558 (1914).
ME. Fisher v. Merchants Ins. Co., 95 Me. 486, 50 Atl. 282 (1901).
MASS. Second Society of Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co. Ltd., 221 Mass 518, 109
N.E. 384 (1915) (provision in standard policy per St. 1907 c. 576); Lamson Co. v.
Prudential Fire Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 433, 50 N.E. 943 (1898) (Policy and provision
in standard form per St. 1887, Ch. 214, § 60); see further Ilutchinson vs. Liverpool
& London & Globe Ins. Co., 153 Mass. 143, 26 N.E. 439 (1891).
Min. Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 80 Mich. 116, 44 N.\V. 1055
(1890); see also Kersey v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 135 Mich. 10, 7 N..V. 57 (1903).
MINN . Mosness v. German-American Ins. Co., 50 Minu. 341, 52 NWV. 932
(1892); Gasser v. Sun Fire Office, 42 Minn. 315, 44 N.V. 232 (1890).
Mo. Offutt v. National Fire Ins. Co., 273 S.V. 161 (Mo. App. 1925); Lance
v. Royal Ins. Co. Ltd., 259 SAY. 535 (Mo. App. 1924); Stevens v. Norwich Union
Fire Ins. Co., 120 Mo. App. 88, 96 S.W. 684 (1906); McNees v. Southern Ins.
Co., 61 Mo. App. 335 (1895); IMurphy v. Northern British & Mercantile Co., 61 Mo.
App. 323 (1895). See also, Security Printing Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 209
Mo. App. 422, 240 S.W. 263 (1922); I)workin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342,
,226 SAV. 846 (1920); and Foster, Arbitration and Appraisals (1954) \VAsii.
U.L.Q. 49.
N.. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Wolff, 50 N.J.L. 453, 14 Atl.
561 (1888),
N.C. Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 106 N.C. 28, 10 S.E. 1057
(1890).
Onio. Graham v. German American Ins. Co., 75 Ohio St. 374, 79 N.E. 930
(1907); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Camahan, 63 Ohio St. 258, 58 N.E. 805 (1900).
R.I. Grady v. Home Fire & Marine Ins, Co., 27 R. 435, 63 At. 173 (1906)
(under provision in standard policy per statute, 1896).
TENN. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott Robertson Co., 106 Tenn. 558, 61 S.W.
787 (1901).
TEx. American Central Ins. Co. %v. Bass, 90 Tex. 380, 38 S.W. 1119 (1897);
Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 83 Tex. 113, 18 SAY. 439 (1892);
Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 71 Tex, 5, 8 S.V. 630 (1880).
VA. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Robinett & Green, 112 Va. 754, 72
S.E. 668 (1911).
Wis. Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 572, 62 N.W. 422 (1895) (under
provision in standard policy then in effect).
Colorado and \Vashington refused to accept traditional common law revocability
of provisions to arbitrate future disputes generally. Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean
& Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 680 (1925); State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett,
144 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927). Accordingly, it is not apparent that the
foregoing requirements of draftsmanship were neCessary in those jurisdictions to render
appraisal provisions in insurance policies irrevocable by action. Concerning the
situation that developed in Washington, see Sturges and Sturges, Sorne Confusing
Matters Relating to Arbitration in WXashington, 25 \WAsI. L. R.v. 16 (1950).
Consult also, Anderson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 152 Ore. 505, 53
P.2d 710 (1936).
Nor is it apparent that such details of draftsmanship remained important to effect
irrevocability in Minnesota after common law revocability of provisions to arbitrate
future disputes generally was ruled out in that state in 1941, See Park Construction
Co. v. Independent School District. 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.AN. 475 (1941).
2. U.S. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvord, 61 Fed. 752 (1st Cir. 1894). See
further Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v.
Hamilton, 59 Fed. 258 (6th Cir. 1893); Crossley v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 27
Fed. 30 (1st Cir. 1886).
GA. Atlas Assur. Co. Ltd. v. Williams, 158 Ga. 421, 123 S.E. 697 (1924);
Goldberg v. Provident \Washington Ins. Co., 144 Ga. 783, 87 S.E. 1077 (1916);
Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Creighton, 51 Ga. 95 (1874).
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not only for the question at hand, but also for their bearing upon the
common law tradition of revocability of arbitration provisions generally.
It is clear from British and American cases in which the irrevocability
of these provisions has been decided that they have been and are identified
as provisions for arbitration. Neither the courts nor counsel considered
ILL. Birmingham Fire Ins, Co. v. Pulver, 126 IlI. 329, 18 N.E. 804 (1888).
IowA. Ilansell v. Farmers' Mut. flail Ins. Ass'n, 209 Iowa 378, 228 N.W. 88
(1929) (Policy covering crops damaged by hail); Mellrath v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins.
Ass'n, 114 Iowa 244, 86 N.\W. 310 (1901) (same); Read v. State Ins. Co., 103 Iowa,
72 N.W. 665 (1897); Leasure Lumber Co. v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 101 Iowa 514, 70
N.V 761 (1897); Gere v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 67 Iowa 272, 23 NV. 137, 25 N.W.
159 (1885).
KAN. Continental Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 45 Kan. 250, 25 Pac. 629 (1891)(the
court emphasized that the text of the provision for appraisal was only permissive
and optional). See Stephenson v. Piscataqua F. & NI. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 55 (1866).
MAss. Badenteld v. Massachusetts Mut. Ace. Ass'n, 154 Mass. 77, 27 N.E. 769
(1891); Reed v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 138 Mass. 572 (1885).
N.Y. Gibbs v. Continental Ins. Co. 13 lHim. 611 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1878);
see also, Mark v. National Fire Ils. Co., 24 Ilon. 565 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1881);
a/f'd, 91 N.Y. 663 (1883).
PA. The position of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with respect to tile
revocabilitv of these provisions is not clear. See, for example, Mentz v. Armenia
Fire Ins. Co., 79 Pa. 478 (1875).
Vith respect to provisions to arbitrate disputcs generally which may arise between
the parties in the future, Pennsylvania has ruled against common law revocability when
the arbitrator is adequately "named" in the provision.
In some of the Pennsylvania cases ruling revocability of a provision in a fire
insurance policy to refer differences over the amount of loss and damage, counsel
or the court have taken note of the fact that the appraisers were not named. It
seems safe to conclude from the cases that this fact has been at least a principal
ground for ruling revocability.
See Needy v. German Ins. Co., 197 Pa. 460, 47 Atl. 739 (1931); Yost v.
Dwelling House Ins. Co., 179 Pa. 381, 36 Atl. 317 (1897); Commercial Union Assur.
Co. v. Rocking, 115 Pa. 407, 8 AtI. 589 (1887); Mentz v. Armenia Fire Ins. Co.,
supra; also statements in Gratz v. Insurance Co., 282 Pa. 224, 127 At]. 620
(1925)(provision under standard policy form per statute of 1915); Penn Plate-Glass
Co. v. Spring Garden Ins. Co., 189 Pa. 255, 42 Atl. 138 (1899). In Chauvin v.
Superior Fire Ins. Co., 293 Pa. 397, 129 Atd. 326 (1925) the Court adds the
confusing comment relating to the provision, namely, that "the appraisement
was merely a condition precedent to an action." (Italics supplied).
See also references to the Pennsylvania cases in Ford v. Grocers' Mut. Ins. Co.,
4 F. Supp. 911 (NV. 1). Pa. 1931) and in Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co., 89 Wis.
572, 62 N.W. 422 (1895).
A similar Scottish requirement that the arbitrator he named to render a general
arbitration provision irrevocable was held inapplicable by the House of Lords to a
provision to refer differences over the amount of loss and damage which was adequately
drafted as a "condition precedent." Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Gilmour 118931 A.C. 85.
In Wright v. Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 110 Pa. 29, 20 AtI. 716 (1885)
the court appears to have concluded that the provision was effectively drafted as a"condition precedent," but that the insurer had failed duly to invoke it and so the
insured could sue. The appraisers were not named. Sec also, Fritz v. British American
Assur. Co., 208 Pa. 268, 57 AtI. 573 (1904).
None of the foregoing Pennsylvania cases indicates that the Court gave any
substantial consideration to the decision of the House of Lords in Scott v. Avery
or to the American cases cited in the last preceding notes.
Wis. See Canfield v. Watertown Fire Ins. Co., 55 Wis. 419, 13 N.W. 252
(1882).
Wyo. See Kahn v. Trader's Ins. Co., 4 Wvo. 419, 34 Pac. 1059 (1893).
3. See the cases cited supra, notes 1 and 2. Also, the opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone in the more recent case of Hardware Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden
& Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
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them as being in any category separate from provisions for arbitration, such
as, for example, provisions for "appraisal," "valuation" or otherwise. The
technique of identifying and characterizing such provisions and the pro-
ceecdings and determinations thereunder as embracing only the "mere,"
"subsidiary," "incidental," or "particular" matter of value or damage (and
not "legal responsibility"), or as involving only "ministerial," and not
"judicial" functions, which has been used in certain other groups of cases
to differentiate them from arbitration, rarely appearcd in the cases ruling
upon the issue of revocability.
Furthermore, as indicated above, it was being ruled in substantially
contemporar, cases that when the provision fails of the required drafting
it offends the common law which invalidates contracts to oust the courts
of their jurisdiction. In other words, a provision to refer differences over
the amount of loss and damage which is deficient in meeting the required
condition precedent falls according to common law revocability of arbitra-
tion provisions generally; the insured can sue to collect oi the policy
without any regard for the provision.
It also may be observed that the necessary drafting of the appraisal
provision and its integration with the insurer's undertaking to pay in order
to make it irrevocable do not require the very words "condition precedent."
Those words have no indispensable role; the required "condition precedent"
has been derived by the courts by the process of "legal construction" of the
provision and its setting in the policy.
4
Again, while the drafting of the "condition precedent" to the insured's
"right of action" detenines the question of revocability of these provisions to
refer differences over the amount of loss and damage under an insurance
policy, the American cases which have passed upon the matter generally
have held that like drafting will not work irrevocability at common law
of a general arbitration provision whether in an insurance policy or in any
other contract.5
4. Of course, the use of the very words may aid the conclusion that the
provision meets the required condition. See Lamson Co. v. Prudential Fire Ins. Co.,
171 Mass. 433, 50 N.E. 943 (1894).
5. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38 (1923); Aaberg v.
Minnesota Com. Men's Ass'n 152 Minn. 478, 189 N.W. 434 (1922).
When a provision in a fire insurance policy is construed to cover disputes
generally which may arise under the policy (rather than being limited to differences
over the amount of loss and damage) it has been held revocable according to the
common law tradition applicable to general arbitration provisions. The fact that such
provision is contained in a fire insurance policy rather than in some other commercial
contract does not appear to be of consequence.
ALA. Maryland Gas. Co. v. Mayfield, 225 Ala. 449, 143 So. 465 (1932). The
provision was contained in a policy covering loss or damage to an automobile resulting
from "accidental upsets." h'lie court identified the provision according to the text
of the defendant's answer pleading the provision as including "not only the quantum
of the plaintiff's damages, but her right of action-the cause of action-and so
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In short, the British and American courts quite deliberately accorded
the parties to the insurance policy power to contract for irrevocability of
these particular arbitration provisions and displace common law revocability
applicable to other arbitration provisions. Their reasons for so ruling are
not made very articulate or clear. They explain how, more than why.
While there were, during the process, some judicial disclaimers of appre-
ciation of any valid support for common law revocability of arbitration
provisions generally, American courts at least were honoring it, as indicated
above, in substantially contemporary cases involving these provisions.
\While it was frequently observed in opinions of the courts ruling
irrevocability that the scope of the provision was limited to the ascertain-
ment of the amount of loss and damage and did not comprehend a determi-
nation of "liability," this limitation was no less manifest in the provisions
which were being ruled "collateral" and "independent" and revocable. The
"collateral" and "independent" provisions were not ruled revocable because
they embraced "liability."
It also is worthy of note that none of the foregoing British or American
cases-neither those holding irrevocable the adequately drafted provision,
nor those holding revocable the provision that was not adequately drafted
as a "condition precedent"-were made to turn upon any consideration of
the rather exceptional circumstances attending the making of the insurance
contract, especially the fire insurance policy. (And, it should be observed,
conditions about to be cited have not been substantially changed by the
standard policy legislation.) Generally, of course, the insurer writes the
policy; the insured may take it or leave it. But prudence calls upon the
construed the stipulation is void as against public policy." See further, New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Blackshear, 116 Fla. 289, 156 So. 695 (1934).
MAINE. Stephenson v. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 55 (1866);
Robinson v. Georges Ins. Co., 17 Me. 131 (1840). The provision in the former
case applied in the event "any difference or dispute shall arise in relation to any
loss sustained or alleged to be sustained." It was regarded by the court as providing
that, "in case differences shall arise under it [the policy), the whole subject, including
both the right to recover and the amount of damages shall be determined by
referees," and therefore revocable.
MiN. Aaberg v. Minnesota Com. Mens' Ass'n, supra, the provision was
contained in a health and accident policy and read "if any difference should arise
at anytime respecting the validity or adjustment of any claim thereunder, it should
be submitted .to arbitrators, and that such submission . . . should be a condition
precedent to the right to maintain a suit in court." Compare the subsequent
Minnesota decision in Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn.
182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941).
6. For such disclaimers see the opinions of Justice Coleridge, the Lord Chancellor
and Lord Campbell in Scott v. Avery reported below.
Like views against common law revocability of arbitration provisions generally also
had been voiced in widely known cases decided prior to most of the American cases
ruling irrevocability of these appraisal provisions. See Allen, J. in President of Delaware
& H. Canal Co. c. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 Lans. 250 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1872);
Chapman, C. J. in Hood v. Hartshom, 100 Mass. 117 (1868).
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man of property to take a fire insurance policy (it is required if the property
is mortgaged). Neither counsel nor the courts in the cases establishing
the rule of irrevocability appear to have considered this unilateral making
of the policy with its requirements and conditions levied upon the insured
as of any controlling significance in determining the issue of revocability.
Instead, the policy generally is referred to as the contract of "the parties,"
as if it were negotiated and consummated by deliberate bargaining between
the insured and insurer.,
Nor do the cases ruling irrevocability disclose any judicial concern as
to how the provision, being irrevocable, might work. These decisions gave
the insurer an extraordinary, if not unconscionable, advantage over the
insured. This is true because the provision thus became enforceable by the
insurer against the insured in an important respect while the insured could
not, in most jurisdictions, enforce it against the insurer in any respect.
Thus, when the parties fail to agree upon the amount of loss and damage,
the insurer can claim appraisal and the insured must comply or forego any
recovery on the policy. The insurer may, of course, choose to claim ap-
praisal or to forego it. If it does not claim appraisal, it must pay the amount
which the insured claims or stand suit with its costs, delays and expenses;
the insured, at the same time, must take what fie insurer offers, or bring
suit to collect. In the latter situation the insured wvill nurse his adversity
as best he can, together with the costs, delays and expenses of the action.
Standard policy legislation wrought no substantial improvement in the
operation of the irrevocable provision.8
But, as is pointed out below, the courts, avowedly undertaking to rescue
the insured from the irrevocable appraisal provision and forfeiture of his
rights to collect on the policy, have ruled a labyrinth of "waivers" against
the insurer whereby it loses its formal rights tinder the irrevocable provision.
It also is worthy of notice that the courts do not appear to have felt
called upon to rule revocability of any of these appraisal provisions in order
to protect the insured from an unconscionable or "crafty contract"; nor
were they deterred from ruling irrevocability in apprehension that the pro-
vision would thereby become a tool of oppression for the insurer and a
sanctuary for it against its obligations under the policy. The judicial crusade
to save the insured from the provision to refer differences over the amount
of loss and damage ili insurance policies caie after (and, it may be said,
as a result of) decisions of the courts and standard policy legislation making
it irrevocable.
7. Compare McCrary, J. in Wallace v. Cernan-Anirican Ins. Co., 41 Fed. 742
(C.C.N.D. Iowa, 1882).
8. These matters are the subiect of comments in Randall v. American Fire
Ins. Co., 10 Mont. 340, 25 Pac. 953 (1891); Maines v. Automobile Ins. Co., 112
Misc. 656, 183 N.Y.Supp. 690 (Sup. Ct. 1920); affd 190 App. Div, 921, 187 N.Y.Supp.
943 (1st Dep't 192t1).
APPRAISALS OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
Such was the course of the judicial process and the focal point of its
concern in the British and American cases establishing the irrevocability
of the provision in an insurance policy to refer disputes over the amount
of loss and damage. It was one of the first of the exceptions to be made
in Anglo-American cases to common law revocability of arbitration provi-
sions in commercial contracts.
Most of the American cases establishing the irrevocability of provisions
when properly drafted were decided in the 1890's. All of them were decided
after Scott v. Avery" (reported below) in which the House of Lords in 1856
finally settled the irrevocability in British law of a properly drafted provision
in a marine policy to refer disputes over the amount of loss and damage.
Quite clearly most of the American courts, in holding irrevocability of the
provision, were persuaded by the views which prevailed in Scott v. Avery.
Consideration will now be given-beginning with Scott v. Avery-to
the necessary terms of such a provision and of its integration in the policy
to validate it against common law revocability as applied to arbitration
provisions generally.
2. Same-Scott v. Avery
The decision of the House of Lords in this case was the first final
adjudication in Anglo-American law that "the parties" to an insurance
policy covering loss and damage to property can, if they adequately draft
it as a "condition precedent," make irrevocable a provision therein to refer
their differences over the anount of loss and damage to the determination
of third persons to be selected by them. The provision was contained in a
marine policy covering a ship against loss from perils of the sea.
By this decision "the parties" were accorded this power over the objec-
tion of the plaintiff, the insured, that to so rule would offend the long
standing common law taboo against contracts to oust the courts of their
jurisdiction.
Certain pronouncements by the Lord Chancellor (Cranworth) and by
Lord Campbell as expressed in their opinions before the Lords also have
rendered the case a cause c~lebre as to whether or not it also determined
that parties can by like draftsmanship make irrevocable a provision in a policy
or other commercial contract to arbitrate controversies generally which
may arise between them in connection with the policy or other contract.
The case has many citations. Some of them, it has been found, are
difficult to verify by the case, and some, of course, are equally difficult to
reconcile. Diversities in the several opinions rendered in the case may well
explain some of this.
9. 5 H.L. 811, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
In view of these traditions of the case, it is reported herewith in con-
siderable detail.
The insured sued to recover on three policies of insurance on a ship.
The ease was centered on only one of the policies, it being deemed typical
of the others.
In pleas to the action the defendant set forth the following Rule 25
of a certain Insurance Association which was incorporated by reference
and made a part of the policy.
Rule 25 as set out in the plea read as follows: [A] "That the sum to
he paid by this association to any suffering member, for any loss or damage,
shall in the first instance be ascertained and settled by the committee [a
committee representing the insurer], and the suffering member [the insured],
if he agrees to accept such sum in full satisfaction of his claim, shall be
entitled to demand and sue for the same as soon as the amount to be paid
has been so ascertained and settled, but not before, which can only be
claimed according to the customary mode of payment in use by the
society. [B] And if a difference shall arise between the committee and any
suffering member, relative to the settling of any loss or damage, or to claim
for average, or any other matter relating to the insurance, in such case the
member dissatisfied shall select one arbitrator on his or her behalf, and the
committee shall select another. And if the committee refuse for 14 days
to make such selection, the suffering member shall select two, and in either
case the two selected shall forthwith select a third, which three arbitrators,
or any two of them, shall decide upon the claims and matters in dispute,
according to the rules and customs of the club, to be proved on oath by
the secretary .... And in all cases where arbitration is resorted to, the settle-
ment of the committee to be wholly rescinded, and the statement begun
de novo. [C] Provided always (and it is hereby expressly declared to be a
part of the contract of insurance between the members of this association),
that no member who refuses to accept the amount of any loss as settled
by the committee, hereinbefore specified, in full satisfaction of such loss,
shall be entitled to maintain any action at law, or suit in equity, on his
policy, until the matters in dispute shall have been referred to, and decided
by, arbitrators, appointed as hereinbefore specified; and then only for such
sum as the said arbitrators shall award. And the obtaining of the decision of
such arbitrators on the matters and claims in dispute, is hereby declared
to be a condition precedent to the right of any member to maintain any
such action or suit." (The letters in brackets, [A] [B] [C], and the italics
have been added to facilitate subsequent references to the different parts
of the provision.)
Defendant's pleas to the declaration also set forth that the committee
proceeded to ascertain and settle the loss (as contemplated in [A] above)
but that, before it had completed its work, "a difference and dispute arose,
APPRAISALS OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
which has ever since existed [relating to said insurance,] to wit, as to the
extent of the said loss, and as to the repairs done to the said ship, and as
to the sum to be paid by the said association to the plaintiff in respect of
such loss;" that the committee was ready and willing "to refer", but plaintiff
refused to do so, "and the matters of the said difference and dispute have
not nor has any of them been referred to arbitrators or decided"; that the
committee did not refuse or neglect to ascertain the loss as alleged by the
plaintiff; that the committee did within reasonable time ascertain the sum
to be paid; that the plaintiff refused to accept that sum and thereupon,
before this action. "a difference and dispute arose, which has ever since
existed between the said committee and the said Plaintiff, relating to the
said insurance, to wit, as to the extent of the said loss, and as to the sum to
be paid by the said association to the Plaintiff in respect of such loss;" that
the defendant and committee "were willing to refer, but this the Plaintiff
refused." (Italics supplied.)
Plaintiff demurred to these pleas and defendant joined in demurrer.
In the Court of Exchequer, 10 the plaintiff's demurrer was unanimously
sustained; judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in a per euriam opinion.
The Court of Exchequer Chamber reversed by unanimous decision,
and judgment was entered for defendant."
The insurer reiterated in the House of Lords the same position which
it advanced in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, namely, that under the
foregoing terms of the policy, in event of difference arising between the
parties as to the amount of loss, the undertaking of the company was to
pay only such amount as should be determined by arbitration. Such was
defendant's construction of the policy with its provision to refer.
"It is conceded," to quote counsel for the insurer in the Court of
Exchequer Chamber, "that if there is an absolute and unqualified covenant
or agreement to do certain things, and then follows a substantive and
independent covenant or agreement, that, if any dispute shall arise as to
those matters, it shall be referred to arbitration, that would be no bar to
any action. This, however, is not the case of any agreement to pay the actual
loss, followed by an agreement to refer to arbitration any dispute respecting
it, but an agreement to pay a sum to be ascertained by the committee, or
if there is any difference, by arbitrators."1 (Italics supplied.)
In the House of Lords, counsel also put the matter as follows: "There
is no principle in law which prevents a man from agreeing to pay to another
the sum which a third shall declare to be the fair value of goods sold, nor
10. 8 Ex. 487, 155 Eng. Rep. 1442 (1853).
11. 8 Ex. 497, 155 Eng. Rep. 1447 (1853).
12. One may wonder how remote this thesis may have been from the insurer's
day-by-day sales promotion.
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any which prevents a similar agreement as to the compensation to be paid
for doing or not doing a particular act.
"Then is this an absolute covenant to pay the loss the Plaintiff claims,
or to pay the sum which certain persons are to declare to be the amount
of the loss? It is clearly the latter." (Italics supplied.)
Counsel for the insured reiterated what had been emphasized in the
Court of Exchequer Chamber, namely, the comprehensive coverage of the
provision to refer and that, if it were sustained, it would unlawfully oust
the courts of jurisdiction. "If a difference, however simple, should arise
between the committee and the suffering member, the whole matter would
be opened, and it would be competent for the arbitrators to entertain any
question of law or fact, and also to decide whether or not anything was
due."5 3 (Italics supplied.) That: "This is a contract of indemnity, with a
collateral and superadded machinery for settling disputes in lieu of the
ordinary legal tribunals."
Before the House of Lords this view was urged again; that the provi-
sion to refer, "while it pretends only to affect the amount of the claim, it
really involves the principles on which that claim is founded. Total loss,
average loss, deviation, and all other matters, are included within it. The
words of the condition itself are, not merely any difference as to the amount,
but also arty other matter relating to the insurance."
Also: "This is said to be nothing but an agreement to ascertain an
amount, but then the reference to ascertain it must come after a difference,
after a cause of action accrued, and consequently it is an agreement to
exclude the courts from jurisdiction, upon an existing cause of action. If so,
the case cannot be brought within that class of cases in which work is
to be done, and the sum due for it is to be ascertained by a third person
previously nominated, for in those cases the cause of action only arises on
the sum having been ascertained." (Italics supplied.)
The House of Lords sustained the judgment of the Court of Exchequer
Chamber for the insurer. Question had been framed to the Judges for their
advisory opinion "whether, looking at the record in this case, the judgment
13. It has been held that the arbitrators may, and should, award "no loss," when
they ascertain that there was no loss or damage. See F. N1. Skirt Co. v. Rhode
Island Ins. Co., 316 Mass. 314, 55 N.E.2d 461 (1944) (under Massachusetts standard
policy then in effect). Said the court:
The plaintiff's position is that by submitting the matter to arbitration the
defendant is estopped to deny that a loss was sustained; that it may be heard
only on the question of the amount of loss; and that an award that determined
that no loss was sustained was not within the scope of the reference. We
think that this construction of the policy is not sound. Obviously the referees
would not have the right under such a reference to determine whether a
loss, if sustained, was covered by the policy or whether the policy had ever
taken effect; in other words, to decide questions pertaining to liability. But
the right to determine 'the amount of loss' carries with it by necessary
implication the right to determine that none existed.
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ought to be given" for the plaintiff or for the defendant. Three of the
Judges were of opinion for the plaintiff; four of them, the Lord Chancellor,
and Lord Campbell were of opinion for the defendant.
It was the concensus of the opinions rendered in the House of Lords
that the question at hand involved the "true construction" of the contract
of insurance with its provision to refer. The prevailing view sustained the
defendant's construction. By the same token, it denied the plaintiff's
contentions that the contract was one "to indemnify him for the loss of
his ship," that the provision to refer was an "independent and collateral
agreement" and "that all disputes relative to the insurance should be
settled by arbitration" so as not to contravene the principle of law that
the jurisdiction of the Courts of Westminster cannot be ousted by the
agreement of the parties.
Justice Coleridge elaborated upon the views which he had expressed
in the case for the Court of Exchequer Chamber. He reiterated that the
defendant's was the "true construction of the agreement," and observed
upon that point as follows: "If two parties enter into a contract, for the
breach of which in any particular an action lies, they cannot make it a
binding term, that in such event no action shall be maintainable, but that
the only remedy shall be by reference to arbitration. Whether this rests
on a satisfactory principle or not may well be questioned; but it has been
so long settled, that it cannot be disturbed. The courts will not enforce
or sanction an agreement which deprives the subject of that recourse to
their jurisdiction, which has been considered a right inalienable even by
the concurrent will of the parties. But nothing prevents parties from ascer-
taining and constituting as they please the cause of action which is to
become the subject-matter of decision by the courts. Convenanting parties
may agree that in case of an alleged breach the damages to be recovered
shall be a sum fixed, or a sum to be ascertained by A.B., or by arbitrators
to be chosen in such a manner; and until this is done, or the non-feasance
be satisfactorily accounted for, that no action shall be maintainable for
the breach. .. "
"I certainly am not disposed to extend the operation of a rule which
appears to me to have been founded on very narrow grounds, directly
contrary to the spirit of later times which leaves parties at full liberty to
refer their disputes at pleasure to public or private tribunals. And I think
the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber stands on a safe dis-
tinction between an agreement which would close entirely the access to
the courts of law and that which only imposes as a condition precedent
to the appeal to them, that the parties shall have fiirst settled by an agreed
on mode the precise amount to be recovered there." (Italics supplied.)
Justice Crowder also agreed with the defendant's construction of the
policy and provision; declared that it "was clearly the intention of both
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parties;" and as for its legality, he concluded: "l am not -aware- of any legal
objection to such a contract, whatever may be thought of its prudence."
The opinions of the Justices favoring judgment for the plaintiff and
revocability of the provision to refer emphasized its broad coverage; that
it embraced any and all differences arising under the contract; that the
arbitrators were, as Justice Compton put it, "to decide other matters than
those of mere amount." He continued as follows: "It could not, I think,
be intended that after the award of the arbitrators it should be open to
the insurers to dispute the claim of the assured, on such grounds as unsea-
worthiness, deviation, want of interest, or of the loss not having happened
through the perils insured against." And again: "It is an agreement to
insure against marine losses, but that no right of action shall arise until
all disputes are settled by arbitration; in other words, that if disputes arise,
the party shall be debarred from having recourse to the courts of law for
the settlement of such disputes." (Italics supplied.)
Baron Alderson also viewed the provision as ousting the courts of
their jurisdiction, contrary to law, for it delegated to the arbitrators "the
entire and exclusive determination of every possible question as to the law
of insurance in the case of a loss," and left to the courts of law "the
insignificant authority of enforcing, if necessary, by suit, the fiat of the
arbitrators."
Baron Martin, who likewise regarded the provision as embracing "any
question of difference which might arise upon the contracts," considered
that the parties were "merely to make use of the courts to enforce the
award of the arbitrators." He also cited what he considered to be the broad
purpose of the rule of revocability which should govern in such cases, as
follows: "It was said that the real ground of the judgment in the cases
where the agreement to refer was held not to bar the action was, that they
were independent covenants; but this is most certainly not so. The true
ground I believe to be, that a prospective agreement not to have recourse
to the courts of law or equity of the country in respect of future causes of
action to arise, is against the liberty of the law, which secures to everyone
the right of submitting to the courts any matters in respect of which he
claims redress.-Sheppard's 'Touchstone' (p. 122)." ' 4  (Italics supplied.)
14. And in the books there was the Note of the case of Kill v. Hollister, I Wils.
K.B.. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1846) as follows:
This is an action upon a policy of insurance, wherein a clause was inserted,
that in case of any loss or dispute about the policy it should be referred
to arbitration; and the plaintiff avers in his declaration that there has been
no reference. Upon the trial at Guildhall the point was reserved for the
consideration of the Court, whether this action well laid before a reference
had been? And by the whole Court-if there had been a reference
depending, or made and determined, it might have been at Bar, but the
agreement of the parties cannot oust this Court; and as no reference has
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There was, of course, opposition to the foregoing view that the pro-
vision to refer was not confined to the matter of ascertaining the amount
of loss and therefore fell by the traditional common law rule of revoca-
bility. Justice Cresswcll advanced this view; that while the provision
(Part [13]) embraced differences relative to "any loss or damage, or to
a claim for average, or any other matter relating to the insurance," and
that the word "claim" applied not only to average, but also to "any other
matter," it was intended to apply "only to the amount of such claim, and
merely provides another mode of inquiring into the same matters which
have been before the committee." (Italics suppIied.) Accordingly, he
concluded, "In all this I find no attempt to prevent the courts from exer-
cising their jurisdiction in ascertaining and adjudicating upon the rights of
the parties arising out of the contract which they have made.""'
been, nor any is depending, the action is well brought, and the plaintiff
must have judgment.
There also was the case of Thompson v. Chamock, 8 'T.R. 139, 101 Eng. Rep.
1310 (K.B. 1799) in which the defendant, in an action brought on a charter party,
pleaded a provision that "in case any difference should arise between the parties
touching the agreement, or anything relating thereto, the same shall be settled and
adjusted by three arbitrators to be chosen, .... " Upon demurrer to the plea and
joinder, the demurrer was sustained. Lord Kenyon, C.J,, observed that "it is not
necessary now to say how this point ought to be determined if it were rcs integra,
it having been decided again and again that an agreement to refer all matters in
difference to arbitration is not sufficient to oust the Courts of Law or Equity of
their jurisdiction."
For further British cases involving general arbitration provisions and decided
before Scott v. Avery, see Williams, The Doctrine of Repugnancy In the Law of
Arbitration, 60 L.Q.REv. 69, 70, 71 (1944).
15. Justice Coleridge in the Court of Exchequer Chamber expressed like opinion
on this point as follows:
But supposing any observation might be made upon the generality of one or
two of the expressions in the rule [Rule 25], it is important to observe,
that, in this particular case, the only matter in dispute is as to the extent of
the loss or repairs, so that it is brought within the terms of the first clause
of the rule [See [B] in Rule 251 which gives the key to the whole.
(Italics supplied).
The provision in the policy in the first Hamilton case, supra note 1, which
the Supreme Court of the United States held irrevocable, embraced differences "as
to the amount of any loss or damage, or as to any question, matter, or thing concerning
or arising out of this insurance," and that the award should be binding "as to the
amount of such loss or damage, or as to any question, matter or thing so submitted,
but shall not decide the liability of this company." (Italics supplied.)
No consideration appears to have been given to the point whether or not the
provision was so broad as to constitute it a provision to arbitrate differences beyond
those over the amount of loss. The Court appears to have considered the provision
as one covering differences over the amount of loss or damage. Compare Stephenson
v. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 55 (1866).
In Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Wolff, 50 N.J.L. 453, 14 AtI. 561
(1888) the provision was of broad coverage embracing differences "as to the amount
of any loss or damage, or as to any question, matter, or thing concerning or arising
out of this insurance. '  It was argued for the plaintiff that this provision related
not merely to the amount of the loss or damage, "but to the whole matter of the
cofitroversy growing out of the policy, and is therefore void, as it is an attempt to
oust the courts. of their jurisdiction." But the court ruled that the first part of
the provision referring the question of the amount of loss "is distinct and several from
the latter and more comprehensive provision; the consequence being that, although the
latter would not be enforced, the former will be." See also, Pioneer Mfg. Co. v.
Phoenix Assur. Co., 106 N.C. 28, 10 S.E. 1057 (1890). Compare Maryland Gas.
Co.-v._May~fild, 225 Ala.:.449, 1.43 So. .4.65. (1932l .. . - . . .
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Being in accord with the prevailing view of the Judges, the Lord
Chancellor also was certain that "there can be no principle or policy of
the law which prevents parties from entering into such a contract as that
no breach shall occur until after a reference has been made to arbitration.
It appears to me that in such cases as that, the policy of the law is left
untouched."
He also took account of the view that the arbitrators were to decide
"not the mere amount, but other matters" which, he said, "were ingeniously
suggested at Your Lordships' bar." He expressed himself as not being "at
all clear" that the stipulation did not have the broader coverage. "I
observe," he said, "the learned judges differed about that." But, he con-
tinued, "I do not think it necessary to go into that, because I am quite
prepared to say that, in my view of the case, that makes no difference
at all." (Italics supplied.)
Lord Campbell's opinion closed the case before the House of Lords.
He concluded, "After a very deliberate and dispassionate considera-
tion of the case," that the contract, in this case "is as clear as the English
language could make it" to the effect that "no action should be brought
against the insurers until the arbitrators had disposed of any dispute that
might arise between them. It is declared to be a condition precedent to
the bringing of any action." (Italics supplied.)
And, with respect to the broad coverage of the provision to refer,
he was of the opinion that it was broad; that "it embraced not only the
assessment of damage, the contemplation of quantum, but also any dispute
that might arise between the underwriters and the insured respecting the
liability of the insurers, as well as the amount to be paid. If there had
been any question about want of seaworthiness, or deviation, or breach of
blockade, I am clearly of opinion that, upon a just construction of this
instrument, until those questions had been determined by the arbitrators,
no right of action could have accrued to the insured." (Italics supplied.)
And, granting the comprehensive coverage of the provision, "what
pretence can there be for saying that there is anything contrary to public
policy in allowing parties to contract, that they shall not be liable to any
action until their liability has been ascertained by a domestic and private
tribunal, upon which they themselves agree? Can the public be injured
by it?"16 In answer to this question he declared: "It seems to me that it
16. Subsequent British cases have followed this view and have held irrevocable
the given provision to refer liability as well as amount of liability, it being adequately
drafted as a condition precedent to a cause of action on the policy. (The Arbitration
Act of 1889 was, of course, in effect when these cases were decided.) Trainor
v. Phoenix Fire Assur. Co., 65 L.T.R. 825 (Q. B. 1892); Scott v. Mercantile Ace.
and Guarantee Ins. Co., 66 L.T.R, 811 (C.A. 1892) (a burglary policy). See also,
Spurrier v. LaCloche [19021 A.C. 446; Woodall v. Pearl Assur. Co. [19191 1 KB. 593.
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would be a most inexpedient encroachment upon the liberty of the subject
if he were not allowed to enter into such a contract." 1 7 (Italics supplied.)
But was there any decided case "which adjudged such a contract to
be illegal?" If there were, "I should ask your Lordships to reverse it; for
it would seem to me really to stand on no principle whatsoever."
Apparently referring to the principle of the invalidity of agreements
to "oust the courts of their jurisdiction," he observed: "It probably origi-
nated in the contests of the different courts in ancient times for extent
of jurisdicion, all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether
deprive any one of them of jurisdiction." He would formalize the true
statement of that principle, as follows: "Where an action is indispensable,
you cannot oust the Court of its jurisdiction over the subject, because
justice cannot be done without the exercise of that jurisdiction. That is
all, and there is no doubt about that. This is the foundation of the
doctrine that Courts are not to be ousted of their jurisdiction."
He was certain, moreover, that no case of which he was aware would
be overturned by sustaining the judgment for the defendant. He was
certain that the earlier cases decided only "that if the contract between
the parties simply contain a clause or covenant to refer to arbitration, and
goes no further, then an action may be brought in spite of that clause,
although there has been no arbitration. But there is no case that goes the
length of saying, that where the contract is as it is here, that no right of
action shall accrue until there has been an arbitration; then an action may
be brought, although there has been no arbitration. Now, in this con-
tract of insurance it is stipulated, in the most express terms, that until
the arbitrators have determined, no action shall lie in any court whatsoever.
That is not ousting the courts of their jurisdiction, because they have no
jurisdiction whatsoever, and no cause of action accrues until the arbitrators
have determined."
And finally: "Here the plea is, that the arbitrators have not decided
as to the liability of the underwriters, or the amount to be recovered, and
therefore an action will not lie." (Italics supplied.)
In summary: By the prevailing view the given arbitration provision
was irrevocable by action-and this notwithstanding (1) the broad cover-
17. In the preceding year Lord Campbell had indicated that common law
revocability of arbitration provisions was no longer, if ever it had been, sustained
by any considerations of public policy. I-Se said:
There seems at one time to have prevailed in our Courts a horror of domestic
forum which I can neither sympathize with nor account for; but the Legislature
has recently in The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, § 11 made a provision
in such cases not that the agreement to refer shall be pleadable in bar, but
that the Court may stop the action. This shows the opinion of the Legislature
that such agreements are not contrary to public policy.
Livingston v. Ralli, 5 El. & RI. 132, 119 Eng. Rep. 430 (Q.B. 1855).
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age of the provision (Section [B] in the quoted text) and (2) the con-
tention of the plaintiff (insured) and of the minority of the Judges that
to so hold would transgress the common law rule invalidating contracts
to oust the courts of their jurisdiction.
The issue involved the "true construction" of the terms of the policy,
including the appraisal provision, and the defendant's (insurer's) construc-
tion was the correct one, namely, that the undertaking of the insurer in
the policy was, in event of difference coining between the parties as to the
amount of loss, to pay only such amount as should be determined by
arbitration pursuant to the provision.
3. Same-Provisions Involved In Early American Cases
The appraisal provision involved in the early American cases first
ruling irrevocability was expressed and woven into the fire insurance policies
(frequently of a British Company) according to a pattern and set of
terms substantially as follows: It was included under a general heading
of "conditions" for the "adjustment of loss and payment thereof." It
followed recitals of conditions or requirements that the assured should,
among other things, take inventory of the lost and damaged property,
permit examinations by the Company and make and file with the Company
proof of loss as prescribed. Thereupon, "the amount of sound value and
of the loss or damage shall be determined by agreement" of the parties.
But, if "differences shall arise as to the amount of any loss or damage,"
then such differences "shall," "at the written request of either party," be
submitted to "competent and impartial persons"-one to be chosen by each
party, and the two "shall select an umpire to act with them in case of
their disagreement." The award in writing of any two of them "shall be
binding and conclusive as to the amount of such loss or damage," but it
"shall not decide the liability of this company." And "until such proofs,
declarations and certificates are produced, and examinations and appraisals
permitted, the loss shall not be payable," (or, "shall not be payable until
sixty days after" the preliminary proofs, etc., "including an award by ap-
praisers, when an appraisal has been required.")
Also, there may be no abandonment of the insured property to the
Company, and "the company reserves the right to take the whole or any
part thereof at its appraised value."
Lastly, when appraisal is duly required, it is "expressly provided and
mutually agreed that no s-uit or action against this company for the recovery
of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustainable in any court of
law or chancery, until after an award shall have been obtained fixing the
amount of such claim in the manner above provided." Not all of the
quoted text appeared in all of the cases; and there were, of course, some
variations from the quoted text. This summary, however is. liEved to
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be typical; it is based largely on the terms of the policy in the first Hamilton
case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.18
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding the
foregoing provision irrevocable was its first decision on the point. In
voicing the unanimous opinion of the Court, Justice Cray briefly sum-
marized the terms of the provision as set forth above and thereupon con-
cluded as follows:
"The appraisal, when requested in writing by either party, is distinctly
made a condition precedent to the payment of any loss, and to the main-
tenance of any action.
"Such a stipulation, not ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, but
leaving the general question of liability to be judicially determined, and
simply providing a reasonable method of estimating and ascertaining the
amount of the loss, is unquestionably valid, according to the uniform cur-
rent of authority in England and in this country." (Italics supplied.)
Upon like analysis and conclusion rested the other American cases
first holding such a provision irrevocable by action. They were thus sup-
ported by Scott v. Avery.
The detail and technicality of making this condition precedent is
more fully illustrated by the second Hamilton case'9 decided -by the Supreme
Court in the same year, but holding that the given provision was rdvocable.
The case involved the same insured and the same fire and property
as were involved in the first case. The insurer and policy were different.
The Supreme Court concluded, again in an opinion by Justice Gray, that
the terms of the policy and appraisal provision were "essentially different
in import and controlling elements" from those of the policy involved in
the first case. The opinion is neither precise (nor meaningful in parts)
as to what were considered to be the shortcomings in the terms of this
policy that disqualified the arbitration provision from irrevocability. It
is concludcd from the whole opinion, however, that the Court was of the
opinion that the arbitration provision was not tied in with the undertaking
of the insurer to pay in such manner as to postpone or condition the
liability to pay any loss, in event of differences as to the amount of loss
and damage, until they were arbitrated and award rendered.
In commenting upon the terms of the policy in the earlier case the
Court pointed out that "the policy contained, not only a provision that
until such an appraisal the loss should not be payable, but [also] an
express condition that no action upon the policy should be sustainable in
any court until after such an award." This policy contained neither.
Counsel for insurer conceded that there was no express provision in this
18. Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., supra note 1.
N9. Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., supra note 2.
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policy "that no action should be sustainable upon the policy until an
award"; and the Court likewise expressly observed that "there is no pro-
vision whatever postponing the right to sue until after an award." (Italics
supplied.) It is equally clear that there was no express provision in the
policy that no loss should become payable until appraisal and award. In-
deed, it may be noted, although the Court did not comment upon it, that
the policy fixed the maturity of the insurer's obligation to pay without
reference to or regard for any appraisal and award in event of difference
over the amount. The policy covered loss and damage by fire to the
amount of $5,000 "to be paid sixty days after due notice and proofs of
the same shall have been made by the assured and received at the office
of the company in New York." This provision lent itself to a construction
that the policy vested in the insured the right to collect on the policy
upon the conclusion of the designated sixty days, without regard for, and
without being conditioned by, the provision as set out in subsequent parts
of the policy for referring to arbitrators differences arising over the amount
of loss and damage. And so, arbitration was not made a condition prece-
dent "to the payment of any loss," which, in the opinion of the Court,
so distinctly appeared in the make-up of the policy in the first caseS0
In short, since neither the "loss payable" postponement, nor the "no
action" condition was written into the insurer's undertaking to pay on
the policy, the arbitration provision was "separate and independent," and
therefore, revocable.
It remains to speculate upon the Hamilton cases that if a condition
precedent expressed in either set of words were incorporated in the in-
surer's undertaking to pay, the appraisal provision would qualify for irrevo-
cability. This is suggested from the Justice's approval in the second one
of these cases of the following rather obscure text from the opinion of the
Court of Exchequer in Dawson v. Fitzgerald2' in which it is stated: "There
are two cases where such a plea [of the appraisal provision] as the present
is successful: first, where the action can only be brought for the sum
named by the arbitrator; secondly, where it is agreed that no action shall
20. Search for the alternative, namely, whether the insurer's undertaking is to
pay a sum at a time (or upon an event) stated, or to pay only what sum, if any,
shall be ascertained and determined by the arbitrators is ever present in these cases.
The decision of the majority in Scott v. Avery turned on the point.
See further the following British cases decided after Scott v. Avery; Viney v.
Bignold, 20 Q.B.D. 172 (1887); Braunstein v. Accidental Death Ins. Co., 1 B. & S.
782, 121 Eng. Rep. 904 (Q.B. 1861) (policy covering accidental injury or death).
Also: Reed v, Washington F. & M. Ins. Co., 138 Mass. 572 (1885) (under
the Massachusetts standard form then in effect); Gasser v. Sun Fire Office, 42 Minn.
315, 44 N.W. 252 (1890); McNees v. Southern Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 335 (1895);
Gibbs v. Continental Ins. Co., 13 Ilun. 611 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1878); Chapman v.
Rockford Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 572, 62 N.W. 422 (1895).
21. 1 Ex. D, 257 (1876). See also, Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v.
Creghton, 51 Ga. 95 (1874); Read v. State Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 307, 72 N.W. 665
(1897).
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be brought till there has been an arbitration, or that arbitration shall be
a condition precedent to the right of action. In all other cases where
there is, first, a covenant to pay, and, secondly, a covenant to refer, the
covenants are distinct and collateral, and the plaintiff may sue on the
first...."2 (Italics supplied.)
4. Same-Provisions In Statutory Standard Policies
As sct forth above, when the American courts first ruled irrevocability
of some appraisal provisions in some insurance policies, there were varia-
tions not only in the texts of the provisions but also in the terms integrat-
ing them in the policies of the different companies. The several com-
panies had written their respective policies and the appraisal provisions
therein much as they pleased.
Standard policy legislation reduced these variations considerably. The
New York legislation has been most influential in this connection.2 3 Legis-
latures of many other jurisdictions have fron time to time either copied
or incorporated by reference the New York policy. Maine, Massachusetts
and Minnesota did not follow the New York provision; their respective
provisions, however, have had little following. Significant variations from
the New York provision are noted below. Accordingly, the New York
appraisal provision is now in effect in more of the American jurisdictions
than any other.
By this standard policy legislation the insurance companies, both
domestic and foreign, must conform their policies and the text therein to
22. It seems unnecessary to use both of these texts for conditioning the insurer's
undertaking to pay. While they are composed of different words, they appear to be
of common purport, namely, in event of differences over the amount, to condition
and postpone the obligation of the insurer to pay anything until the amount is determined
by appraisal.
It has been pointed out that if by the one set of words there is no duty
to pay anything until the amount, if any, is ascertained by appraisal, it is redundant,
"absurd," to require further text to the effect that no action shall lie until award.
See Severns, J. in Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 59 Fed. 258 (6th Cir. 1893).
See also George Dee & Sons Co. v. Key Fire Ins. Co., 104 Iowa 167, 73 N.W. 594
(1897). (It may not be denied, however, that niceties of "construction' in some
cases indicated the need of both the "no loss payable" postponement and the "no
action" until award condition.) See Swan, J. in the Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. case,
supra; Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvord, 61 Fed. 752 (1st Cir. 1894). Consult also,
Second Society of Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 518, 109 N.E. 384
(1915) (provision under standard policy then in effect); Badenfeld v. Massachusetts
Ace. Ass'n, 154 Mass. 77, 27 N.E. 769 (1891) (accident policy).
Under the British decisions since Scott v. Avery it appears that either type of
text will do, namely, words postponing payment of anything until award, or those
providing that no action shall be brought before award. See Williams, The Doctrine
of Repugnancy In the Law Of Arbitration, 60 L.Q.REv. 69, 75-76 (1944). It will
be recalled that the text of the appraisal provision in Scott v. Avery embraced both
types of text. See Part [C] reprinted, p. 10 supra.
23. Concerning the development of the standard policy movement see, HUELNER,
PROPERTY INSURANCE, 25 et. seq. (1938); PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
IN THE UNITED STATES, 247 et. seq. (1927).
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the form and text prescribed by the statute; they may not issue or use
non-conforming policies within those jurisdictions.
It is clear enough that the New York standard policy legislation has
contemplated at all times from the original enactment an irrevocable ap-
praisal provision.
24
The current New York provision and its setting in the policy are as
follows :25
It appears in the policy under the general title: "Requirements in case
loss occurs." It follows requirements for giving notice of loss, for handling
the property, making inventory thereof and filing proof of loss. Then,
under the caption "Appraisal," the provision is set forth as follows:
"In case the insured and this Company shall fail to agree as to the
actual cash value or the amount of loss, then, on the written demand of
either, each shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify
the other of the appraiser selected within twenty days of such demand.
The appraisers shall first select a competent and disinterested umpire; and
failing for fifteen days to agree upon such umpire, then, on request of
the insured or this Company, such umpire shall be selected by a judge of
a court of record in the state in which the property covered is located.
The appraisers shall then appraise the loss, stating separately actual cash
value and loss to each item; and, failing to agree shall submit their dif-
ferences, only, to the umpire. Au award in writing, so itemized, of any
two when filed with this Company shall determine the amount of actual
cash value and loss. Each appraiser shall be paid by the party selecting
24. The text of the present appraisal provision in the New York standard fire
insurance policy was first arranged and spelled out under its present headings in the
statutes in 1942. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942 c. 900 § 6. It was re-enacted in 1943.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 671, § 6.
Prior to these enactments the Legislature had adopted, in 1917, effective January
1, 1918, a standard form of policy which had been approved in 1916 by the
National Convention of Insurance Commissioners. The policy was incorporated by
reference; it was not written out in the statute. The policy was declared to be
the "Standard fire insurance policy of the state of New York." The appraisal provision
contained in this policy as made effective January 1, 1918 was substantially identical
with that in present statute N.Y, Sess. Laws 1917, c. 440 § 121.
The 1917 enactment substituted its foregoing standard policy for an earlier
"'standard fire insurance policy of the state of New York." This earlier policy in
turn, was originally planned in 1886. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1886, c. 488. By the
1886 enactment the Superintendent of the Insurance Department was directed to
prepare a standard fire policy form and to file it with the Secretary of State. This
policy had been designated as the "standard fire insurance policy of the state of
New York." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1892, c. 690, § 121.
The appraisal provision in this policy as brought out pursuant to the 1886
legislation varied considerably from the present provision (§ 168) both in text and
in the manner of its integration with the insurer's undertaking today. It seems,
however, clearly to have been so drafted as to qualify for irrevocability under Scott v.
Avery. The policy form with its appraisal provision is reprinted in CUMMING AND
GIL1,tRT, INsuRANcE LAWS OF NEw YORK, 596 (1899).
25. The provision here reported is taken from the New York statutory standard
form of fire policy. N. Y. INSURANCE LAw § 168.
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him and the expenses of appraisal and umpire shall be paid by the parties
equally."
Following this text are statements of the Company's options to take
the property at the agreed or appraised value, and to replace or rebuild;
also the restriction against abandonment of any of the property to the
company.
Next, under the title "When loss payable" is the following text:
"The amount of loss for which this Company may be liable shall be
payable sixty days after proof of loss, as herein provided, is received by
this Company and ascertainment of the loss is made either by agreement
between the insured and this Company expressed in writing or by the
filing with this Company of an award as herein provided."
And finally, under the heading "Suit" it is provided that:
"No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall
be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements
of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within
twelve months next after inception of the loss."
The adoption of a provision to refer differences over the amount of
loss and damage in a standard form of policy by legislative enactment, or
by administrative action under legislative authority, foreclosed general
charges against the provision of its being offensive to public policy.26 But
the question whether or not the provision was adequately framed and
integrated in the policy as a "condition precedent" to the insured's "right
of action" to collect thereon, was held not to be so foreclosed. Thus, in
the Massachusetts case of Reed v. Washington Fire and Marine Ins. Co.2
the provision in the standard policy then effective in Massachusetts (1885)
was held inadequate to constitute the required condition precedent for
irrevocability.28 Said the supreme court in summarizing its construction of
the provision and its integration with the insurer's undertaking to pay:
"In this case, the policy provides that, in case of loss, a statement
shall be rendered to the company, and that the company, within sixty
days after such statement shall be furnished, shall either pay the amount
for which it is liable or replace the property .... The agreement (to refer]
26. Grady v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 27 R. 1. 435, 63 Aft. 173 (1906)
(provision under standard policy per statute of 1896).
27. 138 Mass. 572 (1885)(standard pblicy per Pub. Sts. c. 119 & 139).
28. By the course of time and legislative changes it appears that the Massachusetts
appraisal provision has reached the required condition precedent and irrevocability.
See Lamson Co. v. Prudential Fire Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 433, 50 N.E. 943 (1898)
(provision under standard policy per St. 1887, c. 214); Second Society of Universalists
v. Royal Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 518, 109 N.E. 384 (1915)(provision under standard
policy per St. 1907, c. 576); F. M. Skirt Co. v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 316 Mass.
314, 55 N.E.2d 461 (1944) (provision under standard policy per General Laws (Ter. Ed.)
e. 175).
Concerning the situation in New Hampshire see infra. p. 28.
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is not incorporated with, but is distinct from, the promise to pay the loss,
and from the provision, which is a condition of that promise, that a
statement shall be furnished; it cannot take effect except with reference
to a loss, which the company has promised to pay,-an existing cause of
action; and it is simply an agreement to refer that matter to arbitration,
without any agreement by the plaintiff not to sue."29
The constitutionality of state statutes prescribing standard policy forms
with irrevocable provisions to refer differences over the amount of loss
and damage and proscribing all other policy forms and provisions has been
put in issue and sustained. Such statutes have been declared valid as
against domestic and foreign insurance corporations alike and also as to
individuals who would become insured.
Apparently, the first ruling of this kind was by the Supreme Court
of Maine in an Opinion of Justices in 1903.)o It was the consensus of
the Justices that neither class of insurance corporation had any vested
rights against such legislative regulation of their making of insurance
policies.
The appraisal provision in the prescribed policy form recited that in
case of differences over the amount of loss and damage it was mutually
agreed that they should be referred, "and such reference unless waived by
the parties, shall be a condition precedent to any right of action in law or
equity to recover for such loss."
Was not this an unconstitutional denial of the rights of individuals
freely to contract for insurance, irrespective of its validity as to insurance
corporations?
The opinion of the Justices covered this question as follows:
"The constitutional right of trial by jury is a right, not a duty, and
may be waived by the individual. It is waived by him as to the assessment
of his damages if he voluntarily enters into a contract like the statutory
29. The court further commented that although the legislature had prescribed
the form of policy with the provisions therein, it is still to be regarded as the voluntary
contract of the parties; that it is no more effective for or against either party than
before; and that "it is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended, by prescribing
the form of contract, and prohibiting any other, to give it effect in depriving a party
rights which, as a contract, it would not have." To like effect see Chauvin v.
Superior Fire Ins. Co., 283 Pa. 397, 129 Atl. 326 (1925)(provision under standard
policy per 1915 statute); Gratz v. Insurance Co., 282 Pa. 224, 127 Atl. 620 (1925)
(same); also Dunton v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 104 Me. 372, 71 At. 1037 (1908)
(provision under standard policy per Rev. Stat. Maine c. 49).
30. In re Opinion of Justices, 97 Me. 590, 55 Atl. 828 (1903). Opinion related
to Ch. 18, P. L. 1895.
It is reported in connection with the order of the State Senate requesting this
opinion that the commissioners in Maine for the promotion of uniformity of legislation
"had reported to the Governor that the statute in question was deemed to deprive
insurers of the right of a jury trial upon the question of the extent of loss or
damage arising under fire insurance policies; also that the constitutionality of the
statute could well be questioned."
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standard insurance policy wherein it is mutually stipulated that the damages
provided for shall be determined by arbitration. It may be urged, however,
that this contract, the terms of which are prescribed by statute, is not
voluntary, in that the individual is practically prevented from making con-
tracts for the protection of his property by insurance, except such con-
tracts as require him to waive his right of trial by jury; in that he is
practically compelled to enter into that particular contract or go without
insurance protection.
"But the broad question of the constitutional right of the individual
to make and enforce contracts for the acquirement, possession and pro-
tection of property by insurance or otherwise free from legislative inter-
ference is not presented here. \Vhatever the extent of the constitutional
right of the individual to make insurance contracts with other individuals,
or unincorporated associations of individuals, we think it clear from the
principles above stated that he has no constitutional right to make any
particular insurance contract with a corporation. . . . The Legislature is
not required by the Constitution to create corporations for individuals to
make contracts with, nor is it prohibited from limiting or dissolving corpora-
tions with which individuals may wish to contract." 3'
5. Same-A Minority View Denying the Power of Parties To An Insurance
Policy to Make An Irrevocable Appraisal Provision-Cases and Statutes
A. Nebraska
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has refused to accept the views of
the courts in the American and British cases allowing parties to make a
provision in an insurance policy to refer differences over loss and damage
irrevocable by action. In considering this question of revocability the court
would not concede any distinction between such provisions and provisions
to arbitrate disputes generally which may arise between the parties in the
future. It has taken most seriously the common law tradition against
contracts ousting the courts of their jurisdiction, including its application
to arbitration provisions.
31. The Justices were also of the opinion that the statute "does not offend against
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, since it bears equally
upon all fire insurance companies, domestic and foreign, without attempting any
discriminations, and does not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."
The Supreme Court of Minnesota was of like mind with respect to its standard
policy form and its irrevocable provision for appraisal of loss and damage. Glidden Co.
v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 181 Minn. 518, 233 N.W. 310 (1930). The
Supreme Court of the United States sustained this decision in Hardware Dealers'
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931). The views of the Justices
of the Supreme Court of Maine were not mentioned by the courts in these cases.
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The court examined and re-examined the question in 1902 in two
cases, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon
Rehearings were denied in both cases.
In both cases the provision was drafted as a condition precedent to
any action or suit to collect on the policy. In the Zlotky case the policy
was reported as being in the "New York Standard Form." The court
voiced its opinion in the Zlotky case as follows:
"Long after the announcement of the opinion in Scott v. Avery, the
people of the State of Nebraska adopted a constitution containing a bill
of rights, enumerated among which were that 'the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate,' and that 'all courts shall be open, and every person,
for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall
have a remedy by due process of law.'" Also, that after the adoption of
the constitution, this court had declared such an appraisal provision void,
because it would, if honored, "oust the courts of their legitimate jurisdic-
tion." 33 The court declared that it was not disposed to change this ruling
"merely for the purpose of putting ourselves in closer touch with the house
of lords [sic]."
The court also was convinced that: "There is no better reason for
upholding a contract that in advance ousts the jurisdiction of a court of
law from finding the amount of damage in a dispute between assured and
insurer than there would be for upholding contracts ousting the jurisdiction
of courts on any other question that might arise between them; and
whenever we say that the jurisdiction of courts may be contracted away
in advance on any question, we open a leak in the dyke of constitutional
guarantees which might some day carry all away."
In a concurring opinion, Pound, C., was more pragmatic about the
Nebraska rule. He observed:
"I do not think the constitutional provision with reference to trial
by jury has any bearing upon the question involved in this case. The
same provision is to be found in the constitution of the United States
32. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W. 736 (1902); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N.W. 746 (1902).
33. The court cited Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N.W. 1085 (1901);
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 47 Neb. 138, 66 N.W, 278 (1896); Insurance Co.
v. Bachelor, 44 Neb. 549, 62 N.W. 911 (1895); National Masonic Ace. Ass'n v.
Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N.W. 466 (1895); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Bean, 42 Neb.
537, 60 N.W. 907 (1894); Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick, 36 Neb. 223, 54 N.W. 519
(1893); German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889).
A study of this group of cases permits a conclusion as to the establishment of
the rule of revocability of provisions to refer loss and damage about the same as
that declared by the court in the Ion case, namely, that the question "was more or
less directly involved" in the cases. The further observation in the opinion that"the doctrine has been assumed to be firmly established in the body of our law" is
without any supporting documentation.
It remains to note that none of the American cases ruling appraisal provisions
to refer loss and damage irrevocable by action (subra note 1) is cited or discussed
in the opinion of the court in the above Nebraska cases.
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and in the constitutions of the several states. Notwithstanding these pro-
visions and the jealousy with which the right of trial by jury is guarded
by the federal courts, those courts and most of the state courts uphold
the distinction between an agreement to arbitrate the whole matter in
dispute and an agreement for arbitration of the amount of loss or damage
only, as made in the case of Scott v. Avery. Were the question a new
one, I do not believe this court would take the stand to which it is now
committed."
"But," he continued, "every court, in the course of time, develops
some peculiar doctrines with respect to which it differs from others of
co-ordinate jurisdiction. Where these peculiar doctrines work no harm,
certainty and consistency are no less important than agreement with other
courts."
In conclusion said he: "The rule in question has been announced
so many times34 that it may be said to have entered into the contracts in
force in this state, and is commonly understood by all persons to govern
the agreements which they make. It is by no means a bad rule and I see
no reason to believe that it operates unjustly."
In the Hon case the opinion of the court was of like tenor as that of
the prevailing opinion in the Zlotky case. It concluded as follows:
"It seems clear to us that an agreement which deprives a party of
a right to the protection of the courts upon a single question, which may
be the question of greatest importance in the controversy, violates the
principle involved to the same extent as would an agreement requiring all
matters to be submitted. If we say that an agreement to submit one
question to arbitrators is valid, then there is no middle ground upon which
to stand. If one question can be submitted, and the determination of
the arbitrators be final, then all questions involved can, upon the same
principle, be submitted. The distinction made by the learned lords in
Scott v. Avery does not rest upon sound principles."
While the court characterized an appraisal provision as "void," it
seems probable that if the parties were to follow through with an appraisal
thereunder, the award would be respected as in other cases. '5
In view of the court's reliance upon the foregoing provisions of the
state constitution and the policy against contracts ousting the courts of
their jurisdiction in ruling the appraisal provisions revocable, it remains
34. He had done so in Schrandt v. Young, supra note 33; and had cited National
Masonic Ace. Ass'n v. Burr, supra note 33.
35. The validity of awards is generally assured although they are rendered
under arbitration provisions which are declared to be against public policy and void
as contracts to oust the courts of their jurisdiction. Rueda v. Union P. R. Co.,
180 Ore. 133, 175 P.2d 778 (1946) with note, 26 ORE. L. Rrv. 280 (1947). But
see the rulings of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, infra note 65.
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to be seen what the court will do with legislation enacting a standard
form of policy with an irrevocable appraisal provision included therein.
There was no such legislation at the time of the foregoing decisions. Ili
1913 the Legislature enacted an insurance code, provided an insurance
board to administer it, and directed the board to prescribe the form of
policy which was to be "as nearly as practicable in the form known as
the New York standard."361 In 195137 it was enacted that the only form
of policy which may be used in the state "shall conform in all particulars
as to blanks, size of type, context, provisions, agreements and conditions."
with the "1943 Standard Fire Insurance Policy of the State of New York.""8
If the Court were to continue with its views as advanced in the
foregoing Zlotky and Hon cases, apparently it would rule, either that the
appraisal provision is revocable in Nebraska, or, if irrevocable, that that
part of the policy is unconstitutional. The latter would be most difficult
in the face of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Hardware Dealers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co.,39 and of the de-
cisions sustaining the constitutionality of the more modern arbitration
statutes making irrevocable and enforceable provisions in writing to arbitrate
future disputes generally.40 It would be equally difficult to rule out the
appraisal provision as being contrary to public policy when the Legislature
has vouched for it.'
1
B. New Hampshire
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled that the referee
provision in the standard policy legislation of the state is optional with
the insured and may be revoked like any other arbitration provision. The
matter was first decided in 1900 in Franklin v. New Hampshire Fire Ins.
Co.42 The court based its decision upon inferences which it drew from
a part of the legislation which provided for the standard policy, rather than
upon a determination that the provision did not adequately qualify as a
36. Sess. Laws 1913, c. 154; see State v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 147 N.W. 689
(1914).
37, NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-501 (Reissue of 1952) (1943).
38, For the appraisal provision in this policy, see su pra, p. 22,
39. 284 U.S. 151 (1931) reported below. See also, Opinion of Justices,
Supreme Court of Maine, 97 Me. 590, 55 Atl. 828 (1903) supra, p. 24,
40. Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Hloulberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288
(1921); Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1931).
41. See Grady v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 27 R. 1. 435, 63 AtI. 193 (1906),
supra note 26.
42. 70 N.H. 251, 47 At]. 91 (1900). The ease was submitted on an agreed
statement of facts. The parties went to appraisal, but before it was completed, the
appraiser appointed by the insured withdrew and refused to participate further.
Three days later the insured served notice upon the company's agents and upon
the remaining two appraisers of refusal to proceed further with the proceeding and
brought suit to collect on the policy. The insurer petitioned for court appointment
of appraisers pursuant to the appraisal provision. Held, that the submission was
effectively revoked by the notice as well as by the withdrawal of the insured's
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condition precedentY3  The provisions of the policy, including the ap-
praisal (referee) provision, were composed by the Insurance Commissioner
as had been directed in the legislation. Neither the policy as a whole nor
the appraisal provision had bcen spelled out by the Legislature. The
policy and its provisions as written by the Commissioner were, however,
expressly adopted by the legislation.
The court explained the basis of its decision as follows:
"The contract, it is said, is not to pay the loss, but only to pay what
three men shall say that the loss is. That is, since the adoption of this
form of policy in 1885, every case in which the amount of loss has been
litigated has been erroneously conducted; and in each case the only in-
quiry on this branch should have been, 'What is the sum fixed by
arbitrators?' The contention is that the referee clause is of the very
essence of the contract; but beyond the policy is the statute which the
policy is not allowed to contradict (Pub. St. 170. § 18), and which shows
that the Legislature did not understand that the question of the amount
of loss had been taken from the court. Section 13, c. 170, Pub. St., pro-
vides that 'If upon trial the insured recovers more than the amount de-
termined by the insurers, etc.' If the only contract made by the insurer
was to pay the amount determined by arbitrators, this provision of the
statute is meaningless; but if the statute means, as it must, that the amodnt
of loss may be litigated, the referee clause cannot mean that an award
of arbitrators is the only foundation for a suit." (italics supplied.)
Pointing out further that "the adjustment here referred to is the
amount which the insurer is willing to pay, or the sum it fixes as the
amount of the loss," the court continued: "If he [the insured] may bring
suit, he is not bound to abandon the action because of a stipulation in
appointee, and that the insured could maintain the action to collect on the policy
without regard for the provision to refer. The company's petition for appointment
of arbitrators was denied. 'To like effect see the opinion in Marvas v. American
Equitable Assur. Corp., 82 N.H. 533, 136 At. 364 (1927). See also, Salganik
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 80 N.H. 450, 118 AtI. 815 (1922). Said the court
in the Marvas case: "The parties are not compelled to adopt this procedure, and
it is optional with the insured whether he will submit his claim to arbitration or
bring an action at law to collect his damages tinder the fire insurance statute."
Search of the statutes has failed to reveal any subsequent legislative revision
pertinent to these rulings. The standard policy legislation appears in the latest com-
pilation of the New Hampshire statutes in c. 407, "The Fire Insurance Contract and
Suits Thereon, REV. LAws (1955). This legislation dates back to 1885, Laws 1885,
c. 93, amended in 1890 by Pub. St. c. 170, and the latter was the legislation involved
in the Franklin case of 1900.
If the parties go forward with an appraisal of the amount of loss and damage
and a valid award is returned, it is conclusive and binding on tboth parties as to the
amount. Salganik v. United States Fire Ins. Co., supra.
43. See the terms of the policy and appraisal provision as reported in the Marvas
case, supra note 42. That a provision and its setting in a policy may plausibly be
construed as optional-merely permissive-and, therefore, as nut constituting the
required condition precedent for irrevocability, see Hansell v. Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins.
Co. v. Wilson, 45 Kan. 250, 25 Pac. 629 (1891).
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the policy which conflicts with the statutory provision under which the
suit was brought. The statute must prevail over the policy contract, for
such was the legislative intent. 'This chapter shall be a part of every
contract of insurance. . . .No waiver of any part of it shall be set up
by the insurer, and every stipulation in the contract in conflict with it
shall be void.' Id. § 18 . . . The parties insured are entitled to a jury trial
upon the question of the amount of their loss." (Italics supplied.)
It is difficult to be persuaded to the court's foregoing construction
of Section 13 so as to render the appraisal provision revocable and un-
enforceable. The provision having legislative approval as a part of the
standard policy form, it seems that it may reasonably be said that the
Legislature intended that it would survive consistently with, rather than
be in conflict with, another part (§ 13) of the same legislation. By ruling
revocability by the process of statutory construction which the court used,
it is to be concluded that the Legislature intended a useless role for the
provision. This is true because, certainly, it did not require legislative
approval of the provision in the policy in order to permit the parties
mutually to agree upon the submission of differences and follow through
with it to valid award.
The truth is, moreover, that the appraisal provision showed clearly
that it contemplated not only that the parties might disagree as to the
amount of loss and damage but it also provided for positive enforcement
of the provision in such event. Such enforcement would bring an ap-
praisal-in lieu of litigation.
By the terms of the provision, if the parties were unable, in event
of difference over the amount of loss, to agree upon referees, "either party
may, upon giving written notice to the other, apply to a justice of the
supreme court, who shall appoint three referees . . . and their award in
writing, after proper notice and hearing, shall be final, and binding on the
parties." (Italics supplied.) This provision for enforcement of the referee
provision by the Legislature certainly invited more endeavor to reconcile
the provision with the foregoing Section 13, before ruling it out entirely
as the court did.44
It seems clear, moreover, upon taking into account the whole of
Section 13 that such reconciliation was readily available. It does not seem
to have been designed to render the appraisal provision revocable and
non-enforceable. It appears, instead, to prescribe for judgments, executions
and allowances of interest and costs when the insured, upon trial, (I ) re-
covers more than -the insurer offered, (2) recovers no more than the
insurer offered. The full Section reads as follows:
44. For further consideration of this process of enforcing these appraisal provisions,
see infra (next issue), Enforcement of Atraisal Provisions.
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"If, upon trial, the insured recovers more than the amount determined
by the insurers he shall have judgment and execution immediately therefor,
with interest and costs. If he recovers no more than such amount the
court may allow interest thereon, and such costs to either party as may
be just; but execution shall not issue against the company within three
mouths, unless by special order of court."
The tenor of this text seems not to indicate a purpose to rule out
the appraisal process entirely or to render the provision revocable and non-
enforceable. Section 13 would serve its purpose adequately if it were ruled
to be applicable when and if the parties go to litigation as, for example,
when neither party had invoked the referee provision, or when the com-
pany had waived or forfeited its rights to invoke it. Such construction also
would have honored the apparent purpose of the provision to enable the
insured as well as the company to enforce an appraisal rather than
litigate.
C. Pennsylvania
Reference has been made previously to the common law decisions
in Pennsylvania. They have denied traditional common law revocability
of general arbitration provisions when the arbitrator is "named" therein;
they have held revocable provisions which leave the arbitrator to be selected
in the future. Apparently, provisions in insurance policies to refer differences
over the amount of loss and damage have been judged likewise; unless the
appraisers are "named" in the provision (and no such provision has been
observed) it is revocable under the common law rulings.45
A standard form of fire policy including the appraisal provision, like
that of New York, is now spelled out in the statutes of the state." This
appraisal provision calls for appraisers to be selected in the future if the
parties fail to agree upon the amount of loss or damage; it does not con-
template that the appraisers will be "named" therein. This legislation
providing a standard form of policy with its appraisal provision dates
back to 191547 It was ruled in connection with the 1915 legislation that
the appraisal provision continued to be revocable as at common law.
\Vhile the legislature provided the form of policy with its appraisal pro.
vision, the supreme court declared: "Statutes are not presumed to make
any change in the rules and principles of the common law or prior existing
law beyond what is expressly declared in their provisions." '8 The context
45. See supra note 2.
46. 40 P.S. § 657.
47. P. L. 409 (1915).
48. Gratz v. Insurance Co., 282 Pa. 224, 127 AtI. 620 (1925). Accord,
Chauvin v. Superior Fire Ins.-Co., 283 .Pa. 397, 1.29 AtI. 326 (1925)..
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and content of the current provision relating to appraisal are substantially
identical with the 1915 legislation.
49
Miscellaneous Statutes: In a few American Jurisdictions there are gen-
cral statutory provisions which mnore or less explicitly touch the validity
and revocability of appraisal provisions in fire insurance policies and other
contracts.
D. Missouri
In Missouri a statute has been on the books since 1909 which declares
that "any clause or provision providing for an adjustment by arbitration
shall not preclude any party or beneficiary" from maintaining an action
or suit on the container contract?"
After extended consideration of various matters which have been
declared from time to time to set apart "appraisal" from "arbitration," a
majority of the supreme court finally decided in 1920 that the statute does
not apply to a provision in a fire insurance policy to refer differences over
the amount of loss and damage. This statutory restriction upon a pro-
vision for "adjustment by arbitration" was said to contemplate "arbitration"
in only its "technical" or "legal" sense, and, therefore, did not apply to
the provision for "appraisal" of loss and damage. 1
49. See 40 P.S. § 657.
50. The statute presently appears in Mo. ANN. STAT. C. 435, § 435.010 (Vernon
1949) "Arbitration." It was originally enacted (Laws of 1909, p. 347) as an
amendatory addition to the Chapter of the Rev. Stats. of 1899 relating to contacts
and promises generally. In the Rev. Stats. of 1909, however, the amendment was
carried to the chapter on Arbitration, and it so appears in the present compilation
of the Missouri Statutes.
51. Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342, 226 S.W. 846 (1920).
Two judges dissented on the grounds (1) that the majority view belied the
intent of the legislature and (2) that this court already had determined the issue
to the contrary in Young v. Insurance Co., 269 Mo. 1, 187 S.W. 856 (1916).
On the latter point see further, Security Printing Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.,
209 Mo. App. 422, 240 S.W. 263 (1922).
In his article, Arbitrations and Appraisals in the Missouri Courts, 1954 WASn. U.
L.Q. 49, 60, Professor Foster points out that the words "an adjustment by arbitration"
as used in the 1909 Act were the very words which had been used in the opinion
of the court in Murphy v. Northern British & Mercantile Co., 61 Mo. App. 323
(1895), which (with the companion case of McNees v. Southern Ins. Co. in the
same court in the same year), first ruled that the given provisions to refer loss and
damage were irrevocable by action. The court, in the Murphy case found that the
policy made it a condition precedent to the liability of the company to pay any
loss or damage in case of difference as to the amount, "that there should have been
an adjustment by arbitration of the suin due plaintiff." (Italics supplied).
In McManus v. Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 239 Mo. App. 882, 203 S.W.2d
107 (1947), the by-laws of the insurer provided for the reference of differences over
the amount of loss and damage. An agreement of submission, supplied by the insurer
for the occasion, provided that the arbitrators were to determine whether or not it
was (1) liable at all to this insured, and (2) if so, the amount of the loss.
Held, distinguishing the Dworkin case, the provision (plus the submission agreement,
it seems) was one for arbitration of the liability of the insurer as well as of the
amount of loss and was, therefore, subject to the 1909 Act. The court also relied
upon the point that the terms "appraisal" and "appraisers" were not used in the
by-laws or submission; the words "arbitration .and arbitrators are used throughout."
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E. Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota
At least five states have a statutory provision applying to contracts
generally which is substantially as follows:
"Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party
thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the
usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within
which he may thus enforce his rights, is void."
Tlese states are Idaho,a2-'  Montana,5. North Dakota, 4  Okla-
honia, 5  and South I)akota.56  The provision came into their statutes
around 1900.
It seems a reasonable guess from the opinions of the courts in cases
involving other issues that this statute will be held to preclude the parties
to a fire insurance policy (or other insurance contract) from making a
provision to refer differences over the amount of loss and damage effective
as a condition precedent to suit to collect on the policy.
57
On the other hand, when a standard form of policy is prescribed by
the legislature and a provision to refer differences over loss and damage is
fully spelled out therein, it seems clear that such specific legislation should
be held to displace the applicability of the foregoing general statutory pro-
vision to such appraisal provision.'8
A statutory provision aimed more precisely at provisions in insurance
policies to refer differences over loss and damage has been fouid in
Arkansas, Vermont and Puerto RicO.
52. ID.AHo CODE ANN. § 29.100 "General Provisions Relating to Contracts."
53. MONT, Rt''. CoDE.s ANN. § 13-806 "Unlawful Contracts" (1947).
54. N.D. Rev. CODE § 9-0805 "Unlawful and Voidable Contracts" (1943).
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 216 "Unlawful Contracts" (1951).
56. S.D. CoVE § 10.0705 "Unlawful Contract Provisions" (1939).
57. IDAHO. See Douville v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., 25 Idaho 396, 138 Pac. 506
(1914). Consult also, White v. Village of Soda Springs, 46 Idaho 1953, 266 Pac.
795 (1928); Huber v. St. Joseph's Hospital, I1 Idaho 751, 83 Pac. 768 (1906)
MONT. See Cacic v. Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jcdnota, 102 Mont. 438, 59
P.2d 910 (1936). Compare, \Vortman v. Montana Cent. Ry., 22 Mont. 266, 56
Pac. 316 (1899).
OKLA. See 'Merchants & Manufacturers Ins. Co., 205 Okla. 31, 234 P.2d 409
(1951); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 96 Okla. 96, 220 Pac. 920 (1923); Scay
v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 42 Okla. 83, 140 Pac. 1164 (1914).
S.D. See Phenix Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 19 S.D. 59, 101 N.W. 1110 (1905). But
see, Seim v, Krause, 13 S.D. 530, 83 N.W. 553 (1900).
58. Consult Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Nichols, supra note 57.
Legislation prescribing the New York standard policy form for exclusive use in
the state and the spelling out of the terms and provisions thereof, including the
appraisal provision under the heading "Requirements in case loss occurs" as reported
supra, p. 22, is presently on the statute books of Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. Ai;N. tit. 36,
c. 4, "Fire Insurance," § 244.1, and of South Dakota, Supp. to S.D. CODE of 1939
tit. 31, c. 31.24, "Contents of Fire Policy," § 31.2401 (1952).
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F. Arkansas
In Arkansas, the following provision, originally enacted in 1903,59 reads
as follows:
"No policy of insurance shall contain any condition, provision or agree-
ment which shall directly or indirectly deprive the insured or beneficiary
of the right to trial by jury on any question of fact arising under such policy,
and all such provisions, conditions or agreements shall be void.' GO
The Supreme Court has ruled, and repeated the ruling, that a provision
in a fire insurance policy to refer differences over the amount of loss and
damage is void under this statute; the insured may sue to collect on the
policy without regard for the provision.0 '
G. Vermont
A provision long standing in the statutes of the state relating to insur-
ance companies invalidates appraisal provisions in insurance policies as
follows:
"A policy of fire, life, accident, liability or burglary insurance, or an
indemnity, surety or fidelity contract or bond issued or delivered in this
state by an insurance company doing business herein shall not contain ...
a condition or clause making an award by appraisers, fixing the amount of
loss by the insured or beneficiary in such policy or contract, a condition
precedent to bringing or maintaining an action on such policy or contract.
Any such conditions or clauses shall be null and void."
2
No decision by the supreme court has been observed involving the
application of this statute. 3
IFI. Puerto Rico
The pertinent statutory provision in Puerto Rico was enacted in 1921
and reads as follows:
"Any clause in an insurance contract depriving the insured of his Tight
to claim in the courts of justice, at any time after the occurrence of the
accident against which the insurance was made, the amount of any loss
59. ARK. STAT., Act of 1903, No. 111.
60. ARK. STAr. ANN. § 66-509 "Insurance Policies-Premiums--Actions" (1947).
61. Insurance Co. v, Kempner, 132 Ark. 215, 200 S.W. 986 (1918); Fircmen's
Ins. Co. v. Davis, 130 Ark. 576, 198 SAN. 127 (1917); See also, Papan v. Resolute
Ins. Co., 219 Ark. 907, 245 S.W.2d 565 (1952) (policy covering damage to
automobile). But compare, Miller v. American Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 160 (W.D.
Ark. 1954)(issue as to effect of the statute upon a '1'exas fire policy covering
personal property in Arkansas).
62. VT. Rav. STAT. § 9187 c. 387 "Insurance Companies" (1947).
63. A similar provision of early origin in the statutes of Iowa wvas repealed in
1947. A standard form of fire policy, including the appraisal provision, like that
of New York was enacted at the same time. Acts 1947, c. 263, Code (Annotated)
c. 515, "Insurance Other Than Life," § 515.138.
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suffered and which has been the object of such insurance, shall be illegal.
The court shall determine not only the liability of the company but also
the amount of the loss."04
The Supreme Court appears to have held that an appraisal provision
in- an insurance policy is so far "illegal" that even an award of appraisers
duly rendered thereunder is void; the insured may sue on the policy and
recover in disregard of the award. "-5
6. Irrevocable Appraisal Provisions--low Invoked
A. Pleading and Proof
Given general validity and irrevocability for a .provision in an instirance
policy to refer differences over the amount of loss and damage to third
persons to be selected by the parties, it remains to observe in some detail
how the courts have made it work. In the cases first determining the
irrevocability of the provision, issues as to burdens of pleading and proving
it and as to performance thereunder were seldom raised. Frequently in
those cases the insurer, as defendant in the insured's action to collect on
the policy, pleaded the terms of the provision, the accrual of differences
between the parties over the amount of loss and damage, its demand on
the insured for appraisal pursuant to the provision and the insured's refusal.
All of this was pleaded to defeat the action. Frequently the insured de-
murred to this answer, thereby putting in issue the enforceability (irrevo-
cability) of the provision.66
It remained for other cases to deal more precisely with the make-up
of the provision and these matters of pleading and proof.
Trhere is near the consensus among these cases that, although a provision
qualifies on the issue of irrevocability as a "condition precedent" to the
insured's "right of action," it is, notwithstanding, conditional upon the
insurer duly demanding the appraisal; the demand becomes a condition
precedent to the making of the condition precedent. A minority has refused
to join in this view.
The results in both groups of cases have been derived by construing
the terms of the provision. In nearly all of these cases the courts have
given most of their attention to the presence or absence of one or more
of the following.clauses in the provision, namely, (1) that there shall be
64. Act No. 66, July 16, 1921, § 175,
65. Parga & Frontera v. Royal Ins. Co., 32 P.R. 73 (1923). See further, George
L. Squire Mfg. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 137 (W.D.N.Y. 1933);
Rodriguez v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 34 P.R. 370 (1925). Compare suPra note 35 and
Salganik v. United States Fire Ins. Co., supra note 42.
66. See, for example, Scott v. Avery, supra p. 9. Or, the plaintiff might put
the defendant to trial on the truth of its answer and to his claim of non-suit or
of a directed verdict. See, for example, Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe
Ins. Co., supra note 1.
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an appraisal "at the written request (or demand) of either party," (2) that
the loss shall not become payable until a stated time after proof of loss,
etc. "including an award by appraisers when the appraisal has been required,"
(3) that no action shall lie "until after award."
fle foregoing near-consensus of thc decisions obtains when all three
of the foregoing clauses are present, when clauses (I) and (2) are present
and, indeed, when clause (1) alone is present. And it is quite clear that
when clause (1) alone is present little attention has been paid to the
presence or absence of (2) or (3). The minority rulings appear chiefly
when clause (1) is absent.87
67. (A) When the provision calls for appraisal of differences as to the amount
of loss and damage "at the written request [or demand] of either party" the courts
are in accord that the insurer must duly make the request or demand.
U.S. Wallace v. German-American Ins. Co., 2 Fed. 658 (C.C.D.Iowa 1880),
motion for new trial overruled, 41 Fed. 742 (1882). In the second decision of this
case the court observed as follows:
The condition did not absolutely require an arbitration; it only authorized
either party to require it by a request in writing. The inference is reasonable
that, if neither party requested it in writing, the usual remedies by suit were
to remain. It may reasonably be inferred that the parties had in view the
possibility that in some cases both would prefer a suit in a court of justice
to an arbitration, and therefore left it optional with either party to request
in writing an arbitration; intending that, if both declined to make such request.
legal proceedings might be resorted to. If this was not the intention of
the parties, it is difficult to understand what purpose they had in view in using
the words, 'at the written request of either party.' If it was their purpose
to require that, in every case the damages should be ascertained by arbitration,
they could have said so in plain terms.
And as for the further clause of the provision that no suit to recover any
loss "shall be sustained until after an award shall have been obtained, fixing the
amount of such claim in the manner above provided,' the court commented:
If this provision stood alone, it might well be claimed that, in the absence
of an arbitration and award, no suit could be maintained; but it refers to
the prior condition respecting arbitration, and the two must be read together.
So read, there is ground for holding that the two provisions together authorize
eithei party to demand an arbitration, but do not absolutely require either
to do so; and that, where either does demand such arbitration, no suit can
be maintained until after the amount of damages shall have becn in that
matter ascertained.
See also, Harrison v. German-American Fire Ins. Co., 67 Fed. 577 (C.C.S.D.
Iowa 1895).
CAL. Winchester v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 160 Cal. 1, 116
Pac. 63 (1911); See further, Case v. Manufacturers Fire & Marine Ins. Co, 82 Cal. 266,
21 Pac. 843, Rehearing Aff'd 22 Pac. 1083 (1889).
ILL. German-Anserican Ins. Co. v. Steiger, 109 I1. 254 (1884),
IowA. Davis v. Anchor Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 96 Iowa 70, 64 N.W. 687 (1895);
Cere v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 67 Iowa 272, 23 N.W. 137, rehearing aff'd 25 N.W.
159 (1885). In the former case the court observed as follows: ,
If we eliminate the words, "at the written request of either party," we have,
in terms, a provision for arbitration as a condition precedent to a right of
action. If we restore the words, the provision is so modified that the arbitration
is only to be had on request. Until there is a written request, neither party
is compelled to arbitrate. Appellant's [the insurer's] construction is that
plaintiff [the insured] must request arbitration, and then, if he desires,
defendant may waive it. That would be the same as if the policy provided
that such differences should be arbitrated unless defendant waived the right.
The language of the policy cannot be tortured into such a meaning. When
a difference arises it gives either party a right to enforce arbitration by
requesting it. If neither requests it, the provision for arbitration is not made
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operative in that particular case. Importance is attached to section 10,
because of its language,-that no action shall be maintained until the award
provided for in the preceding section shall have been obtained. That language
means no more than this: That when arbitration, provided for in section
9, is invoked, as by its terms provided, no action can be maintained until
the award is had. Section 10 merely saves to the party desiring it the right
to the award under section 9; but, if he desires it, he must take the steps
agreed upon to obtain it.
KAN. Walker v. German Irs. Co., 5t Kan. 725, 33 Pac. 597 (1893).
MicH. Nurney v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 63 Mich. 633, 30 N.W. 350 (1886).
Consult also, Blake v, Farmers' Mut. Lightning Protected Fire Ins. Co., 194 Mich.
589, 161 N.V. 890 (1917).
Mo. Probst v. American Ins. Co., 64 Mo. App. 408 (1896). See also, Hawkinson
Tread Tire Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens' 11. & 1. Co., 362 Mo. 823, 245 S.W.2d
24 (1951 )(policy covered "use and occupation" loss, which was at issue in thislitigation).MONT. Randall v. American Fire Ins. Co., 10 Mont. 340, 25 Pac. 953 (1891).
N.Y. See Gibbs v. Continental Ins. Co., 13 Hun. 611 (N.Y. 1878).
OnIo. Fire Ass'n v. Agresta, 115 Ohio St. 426, 154 N.E. 723 (1926). The
Court distinguished the earlier Ohio decisions in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan and
Graham v. German Ins. Co. (cited below in (B) of this note) on the ground that
in the policies involved in those cases "there was an unqualified requirement that
the amount of the loss in the event of disagreement, be ascertained by appraisement."
In the present case, on the other hand, appraisal was made optional upon the "written
request of either party." Compare Madison v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 43
N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1940).
PA. See Wright v. Susquehanna Mnt, Fire Ins. Co., 110 Pa. 29, 20 At]. 716
(1885). The position of the court on the point at hand was of little consequence
because of the general view as it seems to be in Pennsylvania Courts, namely, that
appraisal provisions are revocable unless they "name" the appraiser. See note 2 supra.
\is. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Badger, 53 Wis. 283, 10 N.W. 504 (1881).
(B) In cases involving an appraisal provision which did not contain (1), the
clause "at the written request [or "demand") of either party," but did contain (2)
providing that the loss should not become payable until a stated time (usually sixty
days) after proof of loss etc., "including an award by appraisers when the appraisal
has been required" the decisions are not in accord. But a majority have held, in line
with the above cases, that the insurer nust call for appraisal and that the last
quoted clause implies the requirement of demand by the insurer.
COLO. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rayor, 70 Colo. 290, 201 Pac. 50 (1921).
GA. Atlas Assur. Co. v. Williams, 158 Ga. 421, 123 S.E. 697 (1924); Goldberg
v. Provident Washington Ins. Co., 144 Ga. 783, 87 S. E. 1077 (1916).
ILL. Concordia Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 121 Ill. App. 35 (1905); but see contra,
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Norton & Co., 109 II. App. 63 (1902).
IowA. Lesurc Lumber Co. v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 101 Iowa 514, 70 N.W.
761 (1897).
KAN. Amusement Syndicate Co. v. Prussian Nat'i Ins. Co., 85 Kan. 367, 116
Pac. 620 (1911).
Ky. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham & Gentry, 116 Ky. 287, 76
S. 22 (1903).
Miei. National Ilome Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 106 Mich.
236, 64 N.W. 21 (1895).
N.Y. See Chainless Cycle Mfg. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 169 N.Y. 304, 62 N.E.
392 (1901).
OKLA. Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Rodenhouse, 36 Okla. 378, 128 Pac. 508
(1912); American Ins. Co. v. Rodenhouse, 36 Okla. 211, 128 Pac. 502 (1912).
TEX. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 588, 45 SV.945 (1898).
%'Asi. Goldstein v. National Fire Ins. Co., 106 Mash. 346, 180 Pac. 409
(1919); Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co., 16 Wash. 232, 47 Pac. 436 (1896).
Contra. The Supreme Court of Ohio championed the minority view in 1907
as follows:
Now, could a condition precedent be more express than this? In case of
difference or disagreement the 'ascertainment' of the amount for which the
insurer shall be liable 'shall be made' by appraisers, and the amount 'having
been thus determined,' the same, not some other sum, shall be payable 'sixty
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days after due notice, ascertainment and satisfactory proofs of loss have been
received by the insurer in accordance with the terms of the policy,' not in
accordance with demand or request of the insurer. Beyond all reasonable
dispute, this is an agreement to pay only after an award. But this is not
all of the contract on this subject.
The additional part of the contract to which the court referred was that
providing that a loss should not become payable until 60 days "after the notice,
ascertainment, estimate and satisfactory proof of the loss herein required have been
received by this company, including an award by appraisers when appraisal has been
required." (Italics supplied)
"It is true" said the court,
. . . that the word 'required' may mean 'requested' or 'denanded'; but it
may also mean 'made necessary' or 'made an essential condition,' and the word'requirements,' as used in these policies, may mean 'essential conditions' or
'things made necessary' (see Century Dictionary), and that meaning should
be adopted which would seem to be most in harmony with the other language
of the contract. This phrase 'when appraisal is required' is so strikingly
different from the policies in reported cases which expressly provide for appraisal
upon 'the written request of either party,' or 'when appraisal has been
permitted,' that we may assume that it was intended to avoid the construction
placed on such policies, and when we consider the painstaking care with
which the obtaining of an award is defined as a precedent condition, all
through the contract, we are not at liberty to adopt a meaning for this one
word 'required' and the word 'requirements' which would destroy the effect
of everything else that is written in the contract on this subject and entirely
reverse its meaning.
Graham v. German-American Ins. Co, 75 Ohio St. 374, 79 N.E. 930 (1907). See
also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan, 63 Ohio St. 258, 58 N.W. 805 (1900). Also
Madison v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 43 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio App. 1940).
Accord. MINN. Mosness v. German-American Ins. Co., 50 Minn. 341, 52 N.W.
932 (1892).
Mo. McNees v. Southern Ins, Co., 69 Mo. App. 232 (1897); Murphy v.
Northern British & Mercantile Co., 61 Mo. App. 323 (1895).
See also, Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turnley, 100 Ga. 296, 27 S.E. 975 (1897);
but consult Atlas Assur. Co. v. Williams, 158 Ga. 421, 123 S.E. 697 (1924).
In the following Missouri case, it likewise was ruled that the insured must offer
and seek arbitration before suit. But the report of the case does not disclose any of
the above clauses (1), (2) or (3) in the provision as set forth. Lance v. Royal
Ins. Co., 259 S.W. 535 (Mo. App. 1924).
(C) In a few cases apparently the appraisal provision contained neither (1), the
clause, "at the written request [or "demand"] of either party," nor (2), the clause,
"including an award by appraisers when the appraisal has been required," but did
have (3), the clause that no action will lie "until after an award."
In Kahnweiler v. Phenix Ins. Co., 67 Fed, 483 (8th Cir. 1895), it was ruled
that the insurer must duly ask for appraisal if it wants it; that the insured can sue
to collect without first offering or seeking it. The court stated its position as follows:
When there is a difference between the company and the insured as to the
amount of the loss the policy declares: 'The same shall then be submitted
to competent and impartial arbitrators, one to be selected by each party .... '
It will be observed that the obligation to procure or demand an arbitration
is not by this clause, in terms imposed on either party. It is not said that
either the company or the insured shall take the initiative in setting the
arbitration on foot. The company has no more right to say the insured
must do it than the insured has to say the company must do it. The
contract in this respect is neither unilateral nor self-executing. . . - The
clause is to be construed the same as if it read "upon the request of
either party."
See also, Gauche v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co, 10 Fcd. 347 (C.C.E.D.La, 1881).
Contra.
GA. See Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turnley, 100 Ga. 296, 27 S.E. 975 (1897).
ILL. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Stocks, 149 111. 319, 36 N.E. 408 (1893).
MAss. See Lamson Consol. Store Service Co. v. Prudential Fire Ins. Co., 171
Mass. 433, 50 N.E. 943 (1898) (provision in standard policy form per STAT. 1887,
c. 214, § 60); insured must plead performance or excuse for non-performance, but
his f(ilure to do so must be taken by demurrer;. the defect in such case can be
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Both clause (1) and a combination of parts of (2) and (3) arc in the
provision in the New York Standard Form,""
According to the prevailing view, it is adequate for the insured to
plead generally his performance of the terms and conditions of the policy
required of him. General principles of code pleading and probably of
modern common law practice,69 or special statutory provisions relating to
pleadings by the insured in an action to collect on an insurance policy,10
facilitate the plaintiff's pleadings in this respect.
Then, it is up to the insurer to plead the provision, accrual of disagree-
ment over the amount of the loss, its request to the insured for appraisal
pursuant to the provision, and the insured's neglect or refusal, and to do
so by answer (a "separate defense") pointing out these matters.'
In short, under the majority view, while the appraisal provision may
be adequately drafted so as to qualify as a "condition precedent" to the
insured's "right of action" and be made irrevocable by action, it affords only
an optional and defensive right to the insurer. In this respect the provision
alone is not the factor which conditions the plaintiff's "right of action" to
amended. See also Molea v. Aetna Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 542, 95 N.E.2d 749 (1950)
setting forth that under the provision in the standard form per MAss. GN. LAWS
c. 175, the insured is required to make demand for the appraisal.
Micn. Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 80 Mich. 116, 44 N.W. 1055
(1890).
The decisions in the following cases required the insurer to call for arbitration;
the insured was not required to do so before initiating suit on the policy. It does
not appear that the appraisal provisions included (1), the "request" clause, or (2), the
clause, "including an award by appraisers when the appiraisal has been required."
Clause (3) that no action will lie "until after an award" appeared more or less
distinctly in some of them, but seems not to have been relied upon as of controlling
significance.
Ky. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crist, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 305, 39 SAy. 837 (1897).
Miss. Sykes v. Royalty Cas. Co., 111 Miss. 746, 72 So. 147 (1916). See
also Mississippi Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 133 Miss. 570, 98 So. 101 (1923).
N.Y. See Edwards v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 204 App. Div. 174, 197
N.Y. Supp. 460 (1922)(theft policy on automobile).
S.D. Botte & Jansen v. Equitable Fire Ass'n, 23 S.D. 240, 121 N.W. 773
(1909); Nerger v. Equitable Fire Ass'n, 20 S.D. 419, 107 N.W. 531 (1906); Norris
v. Equitable Fire Ass'n, 19 S.D. 114, 102 N.W. 306 (1905).
VA. Tilley v. Continental Fire Ins. Co., 86 Va. 811, 11 S.E. 120 (1890).
Wis. See Vangindertaelen v. Phenix Ins. Co., 82 Vis. 112, 51 N.W. 1122 (1892).
68. See su/ra, p. 21.
69. U.S. Kahnweiler v. Phenix Ins. Co. su/ra note 67 (C).
ILL. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 121 Ill. App. 35 (1905).
IowA. See Smith v. Continental Ins. Co., 108 Iowa 382, 72 N.W. 126 (1899).
MirN. See Kelly v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 94 Minn. 141, 102 N.W. 380 (1905).
UTAH. See Stephens v. Union Assur. Co., 16 Utah 22, 50 Pac. 626 (1897).
Wis. See Vangindertaelen v. Phenix Ins. Co., 82 Wis. 112, 51 N.W. 1122 (1892).
Even if the provision were a "condition precedent" of more common kind, the
general pleading would be sustained under modem code provisions. See CLARK,
Cone PLEADING 280 (1947).
70. Such provisions were enacted at an early date in some jurisdictions to permit
such general pleading, the policy, or copy thereof, being filed with the declaration
or complaint. See Tilley v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 86 Va. 811, 11 S.E. 120 (1890);
compare Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tumley, 100 Ga. 296, 27 S.E. 975 (1897).
71. U.S. Kahnweiler v. Phenix Ins. Co., supira note 67 (C). Phoenix Fire
Assur. Co. v. Murray, 187 Fed. 809 (3rd Cir. 1911).
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collect on the policy. If the insurer desires appraisal, it must duly demand
it and plead and prove that it duly demanded it. And, as appears below,
it also must be prepared to persuade the jury against any claims brought
forward by the insured that it has "waived" its rights under the provision.
There is confusion in the cases as to the identity of the plea by the
insurer claiming appraisal under the appraisal provision. Sometimes it is
regarded as being in abatement; sometimes as being in bar.72 The insured's
action to collect on the policy is put at stake by the plea but only to
postpone it pending the appraisal. The provision is drafted and integrated
with the insurer's undertaking to pay to this end. If the award is no loss,
the insured will collect nothing. But if the award is for an amount, the
insured may or may not collect. The insurer's liability to pay is not within
the purview of an appraisal and award. In short, the plea of the provision,
leaving, as it does, these further considerations as to the insured's right of
action to collect on the policy, seems to be, within traditional meanings
of the terms, more dilatory than in bar of anything.
The dilatory nature and function of the plea and the nature of judg-
ment thereon are concisely set forth in the early case of Kahnweiler v. Phenix
Ins. Co.," as follows:
"Moreover, if the plaintiffs failed to show compliance with the alleged
condition precedent, their cause of action was not thereby barred or ex-
tinguished; at most it could only operate to suspend the cause of action
and abate the suit. Clark, Cont. 666, 667. In the language of the policy,
it would simply operate to abate the suit 'until after an award shall have
been obtained.' In other words, when properly pleaded, it is a dilatory
defense, and not one going to the merits of the action. It does not impugn
the right of action altogether, and is not, therefore, a peremptory plea ...
CAL. Jacobs v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 5 Cal. App.2d 1, 41 P.2d 960 (1935).
ILL. Maltby v. Empire Auto Ins. Ass'n, 239 Ill. App. 532 (1926); Concordia
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowen, supra note 69.
IA. Smith v. Continental Ins. Co., supra note 69.
Kr. See Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crist, supra note 67 (C).
MINN. Kelly v. Liverpool Ins. Co., supra note 69.
OKLA. Consult American Ins. Co. v. Rodenhouse, 36 Okla. 211, 128 Pac.
502 (1912).
S.D. Nerger v. Equitable Fire Ass'n, 20 S.D. 419, 107 N.W. 531 (1906).
\VAsI. See Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co., 16 Wash. 232, 47 Pac. 436 (1896).
\Vis. Vangindertaclen v. Phenix Ins. Co., supra note 69.
The Supreme Court of Florida appears to require, in addition to the demand for
appraisal, an admission by the insurer of some liability on the policy in order to qualify
its demand for appraisal. This is because "the law does not require the insured to
submit to a purely speculative appraisal of damages as to which it may be contended
no liability at all exists." New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Blackshear, 116 Fla. 289, 156
So. 695 (1934).
The effect of the insurer's "denial of liability" upon the appraisal provision is
considered below.
72. For a remarkable (and dubious) refinement as to when the plea is in
bar and when it is in abatement as undertaken by the Supreme Court of Alabama,
see McCullough v. Mill Owners' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 243 Ala. 67, 8 So.2d 404 (1942);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mayfield, 225 Ala. 449, 143 So. 465 (1932).
73. 67 Fed. 483 (8th Cir. 1895), also reported supra note 67 (C).
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"If this dilatory defense had been properly pleaded, and the issue had
been rightfully found for the defendant, the judgment in the case would
still be erroneous. [The judgment was "that the plaintiffs take nothing by
their action, and that the said defendant go hence without day."] Mr.
Stephens (Steph. P1. 107) says that, upon the determination of an issue 'on
a dilatory plea, the judgment is that the writ (or declaration) be quashed,
upon such pleas as are in abatement of the writ or bill, and that the suit
do stay or be respited until, etc., upon such pleas as are in suspension only,-
the effect, in the first case, of course, being that the suit is defeated, but
with liberty to the plaintiff to begin another in more correct form; in the
second, that the suit is suspended until the objection is removed. If the
issue arise upon a declaration or peremptory plea, the judgment is ill general,
that the plaintiff take nothing, etc., and that the defendant go thereof
without day, etc., which is called a judgment of nil capiat.' The court
below rendered a judgment of nil capiat in this case, which would forever
preclude the plaintiffs from obtaining an award or recovering on the policy
in suit after they had obtained an award. The judgment should have been
that the action abate 'until after an award shall have been obtained fixing
the amount of' the plaintiffs' claim as provided by the policy."7 (Italics
supplied.)
Further evaluation of the purpose of the plea of the provision will
identify it as being designed to stay the trial of the insured's action to collect
anything on the policy pending appraisal quite like the stay of trial sought
by the motion for stay of trial pending arbitration under the more modern
arbitration statutes."5 The plea is readily distinguished from the traditional
pleas in abatement" in that, among other matters, the stay accomplishes
in a substantial particular the enforcement of the appraisal provision.
The plea for stay of trial may well claim recognition in the terminology
of common law pleading as a Plea in Suspension-a plea in the nature of a
74. See also, Gauche v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 10 Fed. 347 (C.C.E.D.
La. 1881); Concordian Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 121 Ill. App. 35 (1905); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 111 Miss. 453, 71 S.W. 746 (1916); McNees v. Phoenix Ins. Co.
69 Mo. App. 232 (1897); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 601-603 (1947).
75. Concerning such motions and proceedings thereon see, for example, the
New York arbitration statute, Article 84, N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 1451; the United
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
See also the amended answer of the appellant in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2nd Cir. 1942), which the court translated
into an application under §3 of the United States Arbitration Act. for stay of trial
of the action pending arbitration. (Compare the unfortunate process involved in
Litrell v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co, 224 App. Div. 523, 231 N.Y.Supp. 520 (1928)
as reversed in 250 N.Y, 628, 166 N.E. 350 (1929).
That the plea of the provision came to be effective under the British Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854 and the Arbitration Act of 1889 to stay trial pending
appraisal, see Lord Campbell, supra note 17, and Trainor v. The Phoenix Fire
Assor. Co., supra note 16.
76. These are pleas going to jurisdiction, capacity and joinder of parties, joinder
of causes of action, and pendency of another action upon the same matter. See
CLARK, CODE PLEADINc 601 (1947).
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plca in abatement. It does not seek "to abate or defeat the writ or action,
but is merely to suspend it."71
"A plea in suspension of the action is one which shows some ground
for not proceeding in the suit at the present period, and prays that the
pleading may be stayed until that ground be removed."7 8
Under the minority rulings, the insured may, it seems, allege his per-
formance of the provision in general terms-i.e. his offer of appraisal and
the defendant's refusal. But he must prove his offer or establish some excuse
for not complying with the provision. That excuse generally will rest in
some matter of "waiver" by the insurer of its right to appraisal."
In these two groups of cases may be observed the beginnings of the
judicial crusade to protect the insured against the irrevocable appraisal pro-
vision.8 0 The courts have taken seriously in these cases the unilateral making
of the insurance contract; almost all of them have recurringly urged that
the appraisal provision is designed primarily for the benefit and protection
of the insurer; and often have they declared it to be proper public policy
that "doubts over the interpretation" of provisions in the policy having
post-loss application, like the appraisal provision, should be resolved in
favor of the insured and against the insurer that wrote them. And "doubts
over the interpretation" have not come hard.
The opinion of the court in the early case of Wallace v. German-Ameri-
can Ins. Co."' is thought to be fairly typical of the judicial attitude of the
American courts in making up their "interpretations" of these provisions
in connection with the plea of them by the insurer.
The provision carried the clauses "at the written request" and no action
"until after an award." The court observed:
"By a liberal construction of the above quoted provisions of the policy,
it might be held that the insured was bound, as a condition precedent to
the right to sue for his loss, to request the insurer in writing to enter into
an arbitration; but it cannot be said that, strictly construed, the language
77. SHIPMAN, CommoN LAw PLEADING 400 (3rd ed. 1923).
78. STEPHEN, PLEADING 84 (1882); see also quotation from Stephen in the
opinion in the Kahnweiler case as quoted supra p. 41.
79. See Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turnley, 100 Ga. 296, 27 S.E. 975 (1897);
Molea v. Aetna Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 542, 95 N.E.2d 749 (1950); Lamson Co. v.
Prudential Fire Ins. Co., 171 Mass. 433, 50 N.E. 943 (1898) (provision in standard
policy form per St. 1887); Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 80 Mich. 116,
44 N.W. 1055 (1890); Mosness v. German-American Ins. Co., 50 Minn. 341, 52
N.W. 932 (1892); McNees v. Soutbern Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 232 (1897). Compare
Kelly v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 94 Minn. 141, 102 N.W. 380 (1905); Madison v.
Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 43 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1940). Consult also
Garretson v. Merchants' & Bankers' Fire Ins. Co., 114 Iowa 17, 86 N.W. 32 (1901).
80. rhis crusade and its consequences are critically examined in the next succeeding
sections of this article. Attention also will be called to the frustration of the provision
even with respect to the stay of trial as to the question of the amount of loss and
damage.
81. 41 Fed. 742 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1882); also quoted above, note 67 (A).
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must necessarily have this meaning. . . . There is force in the suggestion
that the language of the contract did not impose the duty of requesting
an arbitration upon one party more than upon the other. Thc language
employed might well have induced the belief on the part of the plaintiff
that the duty of requesting an arbitration rested upon the defendant if it
desired to enforce the provision, or to set it up as a bar to this action. The
condition did not absolutely require an arbitration; it only authorized either
party to require it by a request in writing. The inference is reasonable,
that if neither party requested it in writing, the usual remedies by suit were
to remain... . If the language employed in the policy leaves the question in
doubt, the construction placed upon it, and acted upon by the assured, is
to be upheld. A contract drawn by one party, who makes his own terms
and imposes his own conditions, will not be tolerated as a snare to the
unwary; and if the words employed, of themselves, or in connection with
other language used in the instrument, or in reference to the subject matter
to which they relate, are susceptible of the interpretation given them by the
assured, although in fact intended otherwise by the insurer, the policy will
be construed in favor of the assured. As the insurance company prepares
the contract, and embodies in it such conditions as it deems proper, it is
in duty bound to use language so plain and clear that the insured cannot
mistake or be misled as to the burdens and duties thereby imposed upon
him."8 2 (Italics supplied.)
B. When Duly Demanded
When the insurer is required to make the demand for appraisal in
order to qualify its plea of the provision, the insured may challenge the
adequacy of the alleged demand and bring the matter to trial in the course
of his action to collect on the policy. If this challenge fails, the plea prevails;
if the challenge prevails, the plea fails.
82. The proposition that the provision is for the benefit of the insurer (rather
than, or more than, of the insured) is best based on the fact that the insurer can
invoke it and thereby, indirectly, but in a very real sense, enforce it, while the
insured can do no more in most jurisdictions than ask the insurer to go forward
with an appraisal. If the insurer refuses or does not respond, the insured generally
has no other recourse than to sue to collect what he claims. (In so far as the
thought back of the proposition may have been that appraisal, as a method of settling
the amount of loss, is more beneficial to the insurer than to the insured, it must be
doubted.)
It would have been more consistent with the intent of the appraisal provision
if more enforcement of it had been provided in behalf of insured and insurer alike.
See below, Enforcment of Aporaisal Provisions.
It may be noted that the solicitude for the insured as voiced in the foregoing
early cases, related to provisions in policies antedating the statutory standard form.
The point about the unilateral making of the insurance contract by the insurer is less
plausible with respect to the standard form because the Legislature has written it.
But emphasis upon the one-sided service of the appraisal provision-in favor of the
insurer-still is plausible because of want of legislative or other remedies for general
enforcement of the provision in behalf of insured and insurer alike.
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When the insured is required to make the demand, the insurer, upon
pleading the provision against the insured's action to collect on the policy,
may challenge the validity of any demand which the insured may claim
he made, and put him to trial of the matter in that action. If the insurer's
challenge fails so that the case stands with a good demand by the insured
and refusal or neglect by the insurer to respond, its plea of the provision
fails; if the challenge is sustained, the plea of the provision prevails.
'When the insured is required to make the demand, lie may, in ieu
of making or purporting to make any denand, rely upon an "excuse" for
not complying with the condition. Generally his "excuse" will involve
some claim to "waiver" of the appraisal provision by the insurer as deduced
from some action by the insurer relating to the settlement of the insured's
claim on the policy. 3 And, as appears in subsequent sections of this article,
even though the insurer shall have duly demanded appraisal, its demand
may prove in vain because of the commission (imputation to it) of onc
or more instances of "waiver."
Accordingly, in the inisurcd's action to collect on the policy any of the
following matters-collateral to the purpose of the action-are always a
potential issue and ordinarily involve trial by jury, namely, (1) whether or
not the insurer's demand for appraisal was adcequate and timely if the insurer
is required to make demand; (2) whether or not the insured's demand wvas
adequate and tinely if the insured is required to make it; and (3) whether
or not the insurer committed any other "excuse" or "waiver" of its rights
under the appraisal provision.
In view of the more prevalent rule that the insurer must make the
demand, most of the litigation embracing the general question as to whether
or not appraisal was duly demanded has centered upon the validity of the
insurer's demand. Accordingly, except as otherwise indicated, the following
text concerns questions as to the validity of the insurer's demand.
While the text of the appraisal provisions currently prescribed in
standard policy legislation varies from that of some of the provisions in-
volved in the earlier eases with respect to the matters now under considera-
tion, much the same questions appear to attend these later provisions as
were raised in those cases. Thus, under the current appraisal provision of
the New York Standard policy, appraisal may be initiatcd-"if the parties
fail to agree"-by the "written demand of either" to select an appraiser. 4 In
Maine appraisal may be initiated-if the parties "shall fail to agree"-by
83. See cases cited supra note 79. In Molea v. Aetna Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 542,
95 N.E.2d 749 (1950) supra note 79, it is indicated that the burden of proof
of the "waiver" in suih cases rests upon the insured. But as in the proof of other
instance,; of waiver of insurer's rights under the appraisal provision, the burden is
sustained by "very slight cvidencc"-enough to support a verdict of waiver.
84. N.Y. INSIRANCa'. LAW § 168; appraisal provwision reprinted supra p. 22.
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"written demand of either,"' 5 and in &Iassachusetts,-"if the parties fail to
agree-," "the company shall, within ten days after receiving a written de-
mand from the insured for the reference," take the prescribed steps to
submit to referees.86 In Minnesota appraisal may be initiated by either party
"upon a failure of the parties to agree," by notifying the other "in writing
that such party demands an appraisal."
The Minnesota statute prescribes an over-all time limitation for initia-
tion of appraisal, namely, that unless either party shall have so notified the
other of its demand for appraisal "within fifteen days after" a statement of
loss as prescribed in the statute shall have been rendered by the insured to
the company, "such right to an appraisal shall be waived."' 7
The adequacy of the insurer's demand may be put in issue by various
challenges of its make-up. Thus, was it adequate in form;88 did co-insurers
join in the same demand; 9 did it extend to all or only part of the loss;"
85. ME. REv. STATS C. 60, § 105 (Supp. 1955).
86. MASS. ANN. LAws 5-A, c. 175, § 99, 100 (Stipp. 1955). The Supreme Court
has commented as follows:
Section 100 of c. 175 provides for the mechanics for such reference, and
imposes on the insured the burden of making a written demand on the company
for the reference of the alnount of loss to three referees, if the parties fail
to agree as to the amount of loss.
Mola v. Aetna Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 542, 95 N.E.2d 749 (1950).
87. NlMrN. STAT. ANN. § 65.01 (Supp. 1955). As is pointed out in a later
section the Minnesota statute provides a little more enforcement for the appraisal
provision than is provided in other standard policy legislation.
88, Where the appraisal provision calls for a written demand, a written demand
it must be. Probst v. American Ins. Co., 64 Mo. App. 408 (1896); Walker v. German
Ins. Co., 51 Kan. 725, 33 Pac. 597 (1893).
If written demand is not designated in the provision, apparently an oral one is
legally adequate. But the insurer should realize the hazard of persuading the jury
that its unwritten words constituted a demand for appraisal pursuant to the appraisal
provision and that the insured so understood them. See Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott
Robertson Co., 106 Tenn. 558, 61 S.W. 787 (1901); also infra, note 91.
In Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242 (1890),
the Supreme Court indicated the role of the trial court, and, by implication, a
limitation upon the role of the jury, in making up the legal construction of an
alleged demand for appraisal, as follows:
Upon the evidence in this case, the question whether the defendant had
duly requested, and the plaintiff had unreasonably refused, to submit to such
an appraisal and award as the policy called for, did not depend in any degree
on oral testimony or extrinsic facts, but wholly upon the construction of the
correspondence in writing between the parties, presenting a pure question
of law, to be decided by the court.
See also, Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 106 N.C. 28, 10 S.E. 1057 (1890).
Compare Madison v. Caledonian-Anserican Ins. Co., 43 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1940).
89. Co-insurers may not join in a single demand for a joint appraisal, especially
when there are variations in the provisions of their policies. Connecticut Fire Ins.
Co. v. Hamilton, 59 Fed. 258 (6th Cir. 1893); Dee & Sons v. Key City Fire Ins. Co.,
104 Iowa 167, 73 N.W. 594 (1897); Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott Robertson
Co,, 106 Tenn. 558, 61 S.W. 787 (1901). Compare Westenhaver v. German-American
Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 726, 84 N.W, 717 (1900)(the several insurers made separate
demands for appraisal under their respective policies; they selectd the same appraiser;
no waiver), see also Hamilton & Phoenix Ins. Co., 61 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. 1894).
Consult the view when all of the insurers have used the same standard policy.
Wicking v. Citizens' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 118 Mich. 640, 77 N.W. 275 (1898).
90. The demand may not be directed to an appraisal of part of the property,
such as, for example, appraisal of salvage separately or alone. Schusterman v. Hartford
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did the alleged demand identify itself clearly and specifically enough as
being a demand for appraisal of the amount of loss and damage?9'
The timeliness of the insurer's demand may be challenged as having
been premature or as having been made too late.
When is the demand made prematurely? The appraisal provisions have
called for appraisal in event either of "disagreement" between the parties
over the amount of loss or damage, or if the parties "fail to agree" thereon.
It appears to have been assumed by the courts that a demand for the ap-
praisal should not qualify under the appraisal provision unless and until the
parties shall have come to such disagreement or failure to agrce. There is
a general accord that the insurer's demand for appraisal before the parties
have come to disagreement or failure to agree over the amount of loss and
damage is premature and invalid o22
Fire Ins. Co., 253 S.\V. 85 (Mo. App. 1923); Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott
Robertson Co., note 89 supra; see also Stephens v. Union Assur. Co., 16 Utah 22, 50
Pac. 626 (1897) (insurer refused demand for appraisal in so far as it applied to the
part of the property totally destroyed).
In Dee & Sons v. Key City Fire Ins. Co., 104 Iowa 167, 73 N.W. 594 (1897),
the insured claimed that the submission should cover all property which he claimed
was covered by the policy; the insurer claimed it should cover only that "shown
in Policies." Held, waiver against insurer. To like effect, see American Fire Ins.
Co. v. Bell, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 75 S.W. 319 (1903).
In Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Hodge, 149 Ill. 298, 37 N.E. 51 (1894) loss was
sustained in two successive fires. After the second, the insurer demanded arbitration
of the amount of loss and damage in the first and denied liability for the loss in
the second. The demand was ruled invalid on the ground that the losses from the
two fires constituted one loss under the policy; the demand for appraisal could not
be split.
91. See Vera v. Mercantile F. & M. Ins. Co., 216 Mass. 154, 103 N.E. 292
(1913); Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 80 Mich. 116, 44 N.W. 1055
(1890); Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 106 N.C. 28, 10 S.E. 1057 (1890);
Madison v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 43 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1940).
92. While accrual of disagreement or failure to agree is widely recognized as a
prerequisite to the demand, apparently there is some diversity of view in the cases
as to what items of conduct transpiring between the parties after loss are sufficient
to establish the existence of the required disagreement or failure to agree.
(A). By one view, a showing that the insured reported the amount of his
claim (whether by formal proof of loss, or otherwise) and that the insurer, without
more, made its demand for appraisal, is not enough. Want of objection by the
insurer to the anount as claimed by the insured affords the conclusion at this juncture
that the insurer does not disagree. Evidence of objection by the insurer to the
amount, and, apparently, further evidence of "bona fide" endeavor to gain agreement
with the insured (and failure thereof), is necessary to the make-up of the required
pre-demand situation of disagreement or failure to agree.
CAL. Famnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246, 23 Pac. 869 (1890).
KAr-. See Baker v. Continental Auto Ins. Ass'n, 111 Kan. 425, 207 Pac. 828 (1922.
Kr. Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingharn & Gentry, 116 Ky. 287, 76 S.W. 22
(1903). The Court observed in passing:
That the insurers merely declined to pay the sum fixed in the schedule and
itemized accounts of the insured is not a disagreement, or differing, as
contemplated by the contract, so as to authorize a demand of appraisal. It
should have been a real difference, based upon the facts which should have
been candidly and fully submitted for acceptance by the other side.
The Court let the matter pass, however, since the parties had progressed toward
an appraisal on the basis that there was the necessary difference between them.
Mxcii. See Zimeriski v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 91 Mich. 600, 52 N.W. 55
(1892). But compare, Kershey v, Phoenix Ins. Co., 135 Mich. 10, 97 N.W. 57 (1903).
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It is not clear why this pre-demand situation should be imposed. The
courts have suggested no substantial reason. It is not clear how the earlier
demand sins against any rights of the insured under the policy. The terms
of the appraisal provision do not require it to qualify the demand. Insist-
ence upon the requirement does not aid in expediting the adjustment of
the amount of loss or the settlement of the claim; it protects the insured
against nothing except appraisal when and if he wins the litigation On the
MI'N. Fletcher v. German-American Ins. Co., 79 Minn. 337, 82 N.W. 647
(1900); Kelly v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 94 Minn, 141, 102 N.V. 380 (1903). A
"controversy in fact" must exist between the parties; the parties must "actually
disagree." (The appraisal provision used the words "a failure of the parties to agree.")
MONT. Randall v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 10 Mont. 362, 25 Pac. 960 (1891).
PA. Boyle v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 169 Pa. 349, 32 Atl. 553 (1895).
There must be "actual effort to agree."
TExAs. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 213 S.W. 365 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919). Said the Court:
The disagreement must be one in fact, evidenced by an attempt in good faith
on the part of the party demanding arbitration to agree as to the loss. A mere
arbitrary refusal to pay the amount demanded, and offering a less amount,
does not constitute such a disagreement as is contemplated by the policy.
See also, Alamo Casualty Co. v. Trafton, 231 S.V.2d 474 ('ex. Civ, App. 1950).
Compare, American Central Ins. Co. v. Terry, 298 SAX. 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
Wrs. Vangindertaelen v. Phenix Ins. Co., 82 Wis. 112, 51 N.V. 1122 (1892).
See also, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Badger, 53 Wis. 283, 10 N.W. 504 (1881).
A special refinement upon the nature of the required "disagreement" was voiced
by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Insurance Co. of North America v. Baker,
84 Colo. 53, 268 Pac. 585 (1927). After reviewing the insured's version of what
the insurers adjuster [one \Vebster] said to the insured after the loss, the Court
concluded that his "entire attitude indicates, not an earnest, bona fide effort on
Webster's part to reach an agreement as to the amount of the loss, but an attempt
to create a disagreement with reference thereto. The provision of the contract
relative to appraisement does not contemplate that kind of 'disagreement'."
When the insurer admits loss to the full extent of the coverage, but denies
liability on the policy, there is no "disagreement" over the amount. Harwood v.
U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 136 Me. 223, 7 A.2d 899 (1939). Consult also, Radwanski v.
Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co., 100 N.J.L. 192, 126 Atl. 657 (1924).
Following demand by the insurer the parties have, from tune to time, entered
upon an appraisal which fails before award. Concerning the probative value of this
fact in determining whether or not there was the required disagreement or failure
to agree at the time of the demand see British American Assur. Co. v. Darragh, 128
Fed. 890 (5th Cir. 1904); Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham, 116 Ky. 287,
76 S.W. 22 (1903); Kersey v. Phoenix Ins. Co.. 135 Mich. 10, 97 N.W. 57 (1903);
Carp v. Queen Ins. Co., 104 Mo. App. 502, 79 S.W. 757 (1904).
(B). By the second view, it seems that less evidence will do to make up the
pre-demand disagreement or failure to agree. Apparently almost any communication
between the parties whereby the insurer indicates its dissatisfaction with the amount
of the insured's claim is adequate to repel inference of acquiescence. Offer of payment
of a smaller sum in a tenor of its being a more reasonable valuation of the loss
and refusal of it by the insured, quite clearly establish the required situation.
Mo. Murphy v. Northern British & Mercantile Co., 61 Mo. App. 323 (1895).
Said the Court: "The plaintiff and defendant's adjusting agent were unable to agree
on the amount of the loss, that is to say, on the value of the property destroyed.
The adjuster made an offer which was rejected by plaintiff. 'l'his sufficiently envinced
a disagreement so as to bring into operation the provisions of the policy as to
arbitration."
NC. Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 106 N.C. 28, 10 S.E. 1057 (1890).
'rexAs. See American Central Ins. Co. v. Terry, 298 SA.V 658 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927). Compare Springfield F. & NI. Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 213 S.\V. 365 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919).
VA. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Robinett & Greenl, 112 Va. 754,
72 S.E. 668 (1911).
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point that the demand was premature. It invites litigation as to whether
or not the requirement has been satisfied in the given case.
The very making of the demand by the insurer after knowledge of the
amount of the insured's claim should be adequate; it should be deemed
to indicate, by that time at least, the insurer's unwillingness to concede
and pay the amount as claimed by the insured)'3  If the parties thereafter
agree upon the amount-well and good; if they do not, the appraisal process
will have been expedited.
If the insured is required under the given provision and local rule to
make the dcemand before he can sue, he too should be free to expedite his
demand after the amount of his claim has been made known (whether by
formal proof of loss, or otherwise) to the insurer for a reasonable time.,4
The validity of the insurer's deniand in these cases also may center
upon the question whether or not the parties' disagreement was truly one
over the amount of loss and damage, or over some other and different
matter."' In the latter instance the demand fails to qualify under the
appraisal provision and is invalid.
The demand may be challenged on the ground that it came too late.
When is it too late?
The effect of any given lapse of time before the insurer makes the
demand is generally tested by considerations as to the reasonableness of
the making of the given demand when viewed in the light of all of the
facts in the particular case.
93. No case lips been discovered in which this precise matter has been resolved.
The Supreme Courts of Michigan and Virginia, however, singled out this very situation
and declared the demand to have been adequately prefaced with disagreement.
Nict. Kersey v. Phocnix Ins. Co., 135 Mich. 10, 57 (1903). The court
cmmen ted:
It is said that there was no disagreement as to the amount of loss, and
therefore that the defendant had no right to an award by appraisers. We
cannot agree with this contention. It appears that defendant knew the
amount claimed by plaintiff. Its demand for the arbitration, with this
knowledge, indicated its dissatisfaction with and unwillingness to pay that
amount.
VA. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Robinctt & Green, 112 Va. 754,
72 S.E. 668 (1911). "It will not do," said the court, "to say that there was no
disagreement as to the loss, and therefore no reason for an appraisal, when the letter
of July 2, 1909, demanding the appraisal, distinctly stated that the writer, as the
agent of the insurer to adjust the loss, considered the claim made in the proof of loss
furnished it was excessive."
94. Under this view requiring the insured to niake demand, it seems that,
when the insured pleads generally his perforsance of the conditions of the policy,
the insurer must, in order to invoke the appraisal provision and put the insured to
proof of his compliance (or the insurer's waiver of the provision), plead and prove
the accrual of disagreement over the amount of loss and damage. See Kelly v.
Liverpool Ins. Co., 94 Minn. 141, 102 N.W. 380 (1905); Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v.
Titus, 82 Ohio St. 161, 92 N.E. 82 (1910). Compare Laruson Consol. Store Service
Co. v. Prrdential Fire Ins. Co. supra note 67 (C).
95. MhN. Mahoney v. Minnesota Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 136 Minn. 34, 161
N.W. 217 (1917) (policy covered crops against loss from hail; the dispute centered
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Generally this determiniation is left to the jury. In Smith v. California
Ins. Co.," before the Supreme Court of Maine, the insurer had delayed
from November 21, 1888, when the insured made proof of loss, until
August 5, 1889, before demanding appraisal. The court sustained the trial
judge who had refused to rule as a matter of law that this delay alone
constituted waiver. But the court further affirmed the action of the judge
in submitting this delay along with other matters to the jury to determine
whether or not there was waiver.
These "other matters" appearing from time to time in the cases have
been attending circumstances generally consisting of one or more, or some
combination, of the following items of evidence, namely (1) evidence
tending to show that the insurer postponed its demand with more or less
purpose to forestall prompt settlement and payment of the loss, or with
indifference for the insured's solicitations for quick adjustment of the amount
of loss; (2) evidence tending to show that the insurer delayed its demand
with more or less purpose to force settlement on its own terms, or to gain
other undue advantage under the terms of the policy; (3) evidence of a
course of conduct of the insurer in dealing with the insured about the
loss and settlement which might have induced the insured to believe, be-
fore the demand, that the insurer intended or wanted no appraisal-some-
thing akin, perhaps, to repudiation or abandonment of the appraisal
provision.9 7
upon whether or not the policy covered crops on a certain section of land. --Held,
not covered by the appraisal provision).
Mo. Hawkinson Tread Tire Co. v. Indiana Luurberisens I. & I. Co., 362
Mo. 823. 245 S.W.2d 24 (1951)(difference over amount payable derived from
different interpretations as to the terms of the policy; held, not one over the amount
of loss).
N.Y. Rosenwald v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 50 Ihn. 172 (N.Y. 1888) (difference
as to how the amount of loss should be figured-whetber at market value or at cost
of the property; held, not a difference over the amount of loss).
TEx. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 588, 45 S.W.
945 (1898): Adams Casualty Co. v. Trafton, 231 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
(disagreement said to he "merely as to the basis of estimating the loss").
Vis. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Badger, 53 Wis. 283, 10 N.W. 504 (1881)
(difference over "the liability of the company to pay anything whatever"-held, not
one over the arount of loss); See also, Nelson v. Atlanta Hone Ins. Co., 120 N.C.
302, 27 S.E. 38 (1897); Williams v. American Ins. Co., 196 Ill. App. 370 (1915).
96. 87 Me. 190, 32 Atl. 872 (1895).
97. Chainless Cycle Mfg. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 169 NY. 304, 62 N.E. 392
(1901) is most frequently (and approvingly) cited in the other cases ruling on this
instance of waiver based on the delay of the demand. The case embraced a combination
of the foregoing "other matters" which were packaged with the insurer's delay in
demanding appraisal and sent to the jury on the question of waiver. Insured notified
the insurer of the loss on the date it occurred, August 16, 1899. The insurer
referred the adjustment of the claim to an adjuster; various negotiations followed;
and, as requested by the adjuster, the insured filed proof of loss on August 30, 1899.
Insured pressed for quick settlement so that it might dispose of the salvage without
further loss or expense. Adjuster expressed surprise to the insured that its claim of
loss was so large and advised the insurer that the amount claimed in the proof of
loss was exorbitant. Insured formally demanded appraisal; the adjuster replied that
he did not want an appraisal but wanted to settle. A figure for a proposed settlement
was concluded between the adjuster and insured and the insured thereupon sold
N
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Time limitations for the insurer to make its demand for appraisal also
have been ruled in connection with the provision in the policy fixing the
times for payment of loss under the policy. That provision frequently has
been to the effect that "the loss shall not become payable until sixty days
[or other stated period] after the notice, ascertainment, estimate and satis-
factory proofs of loss herein required have been received by this company,
including an award when appraisal has been required."
May the insurer have the full 60 days (or other stated period) after
proof of loss in which to make its demand for appraisal, or is it subject
to "a reasonable time" limitation to be determined by the jury? Is its
opportunity to make demand foreclosed when the 60-day period expires?
According to the prevailing view, a demand before the close of the
60 days may be tested for its reasonableness before the jury; but a demand
for appraisal after that 60-day period has expired comes too late; it is too
late as a matter of law.
In so ruling, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma put the matter as fol-
lows: The insurer "must demand appraisement, if at all, within a reasonable
time, to be determined by the jury under the circumstances of each case,
from the date as the circumstances of each may show to be the period at
which the desirability or necessity of appraisement or inspection of the goods
first arises, such reasonable time, in no event to be carried beyond the period
the salvage. Insurer repudiated this settlement and on September 12 or 13, 1899
formally demanded appraisal. Total elapsed time: August 16, 1899, date of loss, to
September 12 or 13, 1899, date of demand. Insured commenced suit on November
2, 1899.
The jury found waiver. The Court observed that "the main question that we
are called upon to decide is whether there was any evidence to warrant the iury in
finding a waiver. (italics supplied). Thc jury was sustained.
The Court, after reviewing the foregoing course of conduct on the part of the
insurer and insured, concluded:
..lThe evidence warrants the inference that it [the insurer] did not desire an
appraisal and had no intention of requiring one until it thought it could take advantage
of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, we cannot say, as matter of law, that
the demand of the defendant for an appraisal was reasonable; for it was bound to
act in good faith, and not to remain silent when it was its duty to speak." (italics
supplied).
By lse way of further comment upon the required course of conduct of the
parties, including the making of demand for appraisal in such cases, the Court observed
as follows:
That right [to appraisal] is not indefinite as to time, but must be exercised
within a reasonable period, depending upon the facts of the particular case.
Neither party can so use the right as to take undue advantage of the other;
but both must act in good faith. It is not a weapon of attack, but of
defense, and a party who intends to use it must give reasonable notice of such
intention; for its omission to do so will be evidence of waiver, more or less
conclusive according to the circumstances. The insurer, for instance, knowing
that the insured desires a prompt appraisal or an adjustment, so that the
property may not suffer further injury before it is sold, cannot postpone its
demand for an appraisal until after the insured, misled by its acts, has been
plaeced in a position where one is impossible. (italics supplied).
See further the views advanced in Provident Washington Ins. Co. v. Volf, 168 Ind.
690, 80 N.E. 26 (1907).
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of 60 days after the receipt of the proof of loss, since it is apparent that, if
no demand be made within sixty days after the receipt of the proof of loss,
the right to the payment of the amount due, if any, becomes absolute, and
may not be changed by any subsequent act of the insurer." (Italics
supplied.)I 8
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Virginia has declared that
the insurer has the 60 days within which to make its demand 9
When the insured is required to make the demand before he can
maintain his action to collect, greater indulgences may be expected to
98. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Hays & Son, 57 Okla. 266, 156 Pac. 673 (1916).
To like effect: U.S. See Hamilton v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 61 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. 1894).
CAL. Winchester v. North British Ins. Co., 160 Cal. 1, 116 Pac. 63 (1911).
Consult also, Covey v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 579, 161 Pac.
35 (1916).
LA. Stone v. Commercial Fire & Cas. Co., 50 So.2d 327 (La. App. 1951).
Micu. See Brock v. The Dwelling House Ins. Co., 102 Mich. 583, 61 N.W. 67
(1894).
Miss. See Sykes v. Royal Cas. Co., 111 Miss. 746, 72 So. 147 (1916).
N.Y. Langsner v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 67 Misc. 411, 123 N.Y. Supp.
144 (1910).
TEXAS. See American Central Ins. Co. v. Heath, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 445, 69
S.W. 235 (1902).
Consult further, Ilays v. Milford Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 170 Mass. 492, 49 N.E.
754 (1898).
It seems that the Florida Supreme Court starts the 60 days loss-payable provision
from the date when the insurer admits liability for some amount. Insurer's demand
after said 60 days is too late. Bear v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 138 Fla. 298, 189 So.
252 (1939).
Suppose that the insurer makes demand for appraisal within the 60 days, but
not until the very last days of the period. Arrangements for the appraisal are not
likely to be concluded until after "the right to payment of the amount due, if any,"
to quote the Oklahoma Court "becomes absolute" (supra at 276, 156 Pac. at 676)
There is some authority indicating that, as a matter of law, such demand is too late.
See Zimeriski v. The Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 91 Mich. 600, 52 N.W. 55 (1892);
also Langsner v. German Alliance Ins. Co. sura.
And in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Caye, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 810 (1893), it is
written that "where the policy provides that the loss shall be payable within a
certain time after the proofs of loss are received, the request for arbitration must be
made within that time, and not only within that time, but early enough to permit
arbitration to be had before the expiration of the time." See also the views expressed
in Hamilton v. Phoenix Ins. Co., supra.
Even if the delay until the last hours of the 60 day period in making the
demand is not fatal as a matter of law, it seems probable that a verdict of waiver
based only upon such delay (without evidence tending to establish any of the "other
matters") will be sustained. See Boston Ins. Co. v. Kirby, 281 S.W. 275 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926). Said the Court:
In this case appellants waited for 58 days on one policy and 59 on the
other, after receiving proof of loss, before making demand. It being a
question of fact as to what would constitute a reasonable time, and the jury
having found against appellee on that issue, it cannot be said that appellants
were within their contractual rights at the time their demand was made.
99. North British & M. Ins. Co. v. Robinett, 112 Va. 754, 72 S.E. 668 (1911).
In truth, the 60 day period had not expired when the demand was made; proof
of loss was received by the insurer on May 18, 1909; the demand, a letter, was
received by the insured on July 5, 1909. Compare the views as voiced in Tilley v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 86 Va. 811, 11 S.E. 120 (1890) with which compare,
in turn, those advanced in Bratley v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 159 Minn.
14. 198 N.W. 128 (1924).
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sustain the validity of his demand. Such litigation as there has been in
this connection has involved chiefly the issue whether or not the insured's
demand came too late.
00
In McNees v. Southern Ins. Co.1 1 the insurer refused a demand for
appraisal from the insured which came "near two years after the loss." In
saving the plaintiff's delayed denand and suit to recover on the policy, a
Missouri Court of Appeals based its ruling upon the following considerations:
"Though it be true that the insured, in bringing suit, thereby holding
the affirmative and the onus of showing himself entitled to sue, must act
if the other does not, yet the company may very well, if it so desires, take
the initiative, on a difference arising, and demand an arbitration. If the
company, knowing there is a disagreement as to the amount of the loss
and of its right to have an arbitration, omits to call for such arbitration
it ought not to be heard to complain of plaintiff's mere delay in making
the offer.'112 The court expressed the further view that its position in this
connection was "in harmony with that rule of law which disfavors forfeitures
except when clearly demanded by the stipulation of the parties."'
0 5
100. See, however, Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Schallman, 188 Il1. 213, 59 N.E. 12
(1900)(issue as to whether or not the demand served on one who was an agent of
the insurer was binding on the insurer); Madison v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co.,
43 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio App. 1940) (issue as to whether the communication was a
demand for appraisal, or something else); Morley v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 85 Mich. 210,
48 N.W. 502 (1891)(issue as to proper pleading by insurer of want of appraisal).
101. 69 Mo. App, 232 (1897). To the same effect in the same court, Johnson
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 226 (1897); Ciapanna v. Lincoln Fire Ins. Co.
of N.Y., 153 Ore. 395, 56 P.2d 1113 (1936). See also Schripfer v. Rockford Ins.
Co., 77 Minn. 291, 79 N.W. 1005 (1890); Nlesser v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins.
Co., 42 R.1, 460, 108 Atl. 832 (1920). Compare the views and rulings in Graham
v. German-American Ins. Co., 75 Ohio St. 374, 79 N.E. 930 (1907).
102. If demand were made only after so long a period that the property
"would be in such condition that an appraisal would be an idle ceremony," perhaps
it would be too late. See Reilley v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 311 Ill. App. 562 (1941);
also the McNees and Johnson cases, supra note 101. Consult further, Morley v.
Liverpool Ins. Co., supra note 100; Schrepfer v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Minn. 291,
79 N.W. 1005 (1890); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Conner, 79 So.2d 236 (Miss. 1955).
Compare Ciapanna v. Lincoln Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., supra note 101.
103. Suppose that the demand is made only after the insured has commenced
suit to collect on the policy?
Two general combinations of circumstances have come to pass involving this
general question.
(1) In the first the insured, being required to make the demand, failed to do so
until after he had commenced suit to collect on the policy; the insurer refused
because of this delay.
judicial opinion on this situation appears to favor excusing the insured's delay
and holding the insurer's refusal a waiver.
In Johnson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Mo. App. 226 (1896), demand was made
by the insured for the first time while his action was pending. Insurer refused.
It had pleaded the appraisal provision against the actiou. That action was dismissed.
The insured was allowed to maintain his second action over insurer's plea of the
appraisal provision. The insurer's foregoing refusal was held to be a waiver. To like
effect see Gragg v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 140 Mo. App. 685 (1910); and the
dissenting opinion in Schweir v. Atlas Assur. Co., 227 Mich. 104, 198 N.W. 719
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Note: This preseut study will be concluded in a subsequent issue of
tie Miami Law Quarterly.
(1924). See also Barton v. Automobile Ins. Co., 309 Mass. 128, 34 N.E,2d 516(1941t(4} In the second situation the insurer had duly demanded appraisal and the
insured refused; then the insured, after commencing suit, made overtures for
appraisal and the insurer refused or disregarded them. In Schrepfer v. Rockford
Ins. Co., 77 Minn. 291, 79 N.W. 1005 (1890) the Court held that the insured
could maintain his action; that the insurer's refusal constituted waiver of its right
to appraisal. "There is no evidence," said the Court, "that the defendant has,
by reason of the delay, been deprived of any legal right or suffered any damage; not
even the loss of evidence. . . It is not particularly the length of the delay, but
the prejudicial consequence of it, that is material."
On the other hand, in Zalesky v. Home Ins. Co., 102 Iowa 613, 71 N.W. 566
(1897), the insured started suit after refusing insurer's demand for appraisal. Held,
error to grant insured (over objection by insurer) a continuance to allow him to
offer appraisal; also that refusal by the insurer of the insured's demand, made after
his action was commenced, was not waiver. Nor could the insured use a supplemental
petition to escape insurer's plea of the appraisal provision.
In Schwier v. Atlas Assur. Co. supra, the insured also started suit after refusing
insurer's demand. While the action was pending the insured tendered an offer or
demand for appraisal; insurer refused. The majority of the court ruled that the insured
could not maintain the action; that the insurer's refusal was not waiver; that a party
litigant may not "sue first and obtain his cause of action afterwards."
Consult also, Barton v. Automobile Ins. Co., 309 Mass. 128, 34 N.E.2d 516
(1941); Goldstein v. National Fire Ins. Co., 106 Wash, 346, 180 Pac. 409 (1919).
